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While the Jones Court held unanimously that the Government's use
of a GPS device to track Antoine Jones's vehicle for twenty-eight
days was a Fourth Amendment search, the Justices disagreed on
the facts and rationale supporting the holding. Beyond the very
narrow trespass-based search theory regulating the Government's
attachment of a GPS device to Jones's vehicle with the intent to
gather information, the majority opinion does nothing to constrain
government use of other tracking technologies, including cell
phones, which merely involve the transmission of electronic
signals without physical trespass. While the concurring opinions
endorse application of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test to instances of government use of tracking technologies that do
not depend on physical trespass, they offer little in the way of clear,
concrete guidance to lower courts that would seek to apply Katz in
such cases. Taken as a whole, then, the Jones opinions leave us
still "Jonesing" for a privacy mandate. As of the writing of this
Article, Congress has not been successful in passing legislation
that would regulate government use of tracking technologies. A
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third regulator of government power has emerged, however, in the
form of technology itself specifically in new(ish) methods an
individual or group of individuals can use to make it more difficult,
in some cases perhaps impossible, for law enforcement to obtain
the information it seeks. While waiting for more definitive action
from the courts and Congress, such "privacy enhancing"
anonymization and encryption technologies can provide a
temporary 'fix" to the problem of ever-expanding police powers in
the digital age, insofar as they make law enforcement
investigations more difficult and expensive, thereby forcing law
enforcement to prioritize some investigations and, perhaps, de-
emphasize or drop others. Moreover, at a time when cybersecurity
is a national security priority and recommended "best practices"
include the use of encryption technologies to protect, among other
things, U.S. intellectual property, law enforcement is likely to face
continued instances of "Going Dark" as it attempts to intercept
communications in the face of the increasing availability and use
of encryption technologies. As Congress considers possibilities for
expanding law enforcement interception capabilities, it will be
forced to accommodate the complex dualistic properties of
technologies that, on one hand, bolster our national security
against certain kind of threats while, on the other, they limit or
thwart law enforcement's ability to fulfill its traditional public
safety function of investigating crimes.
I. INTRODUCTION
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think there would also not be a
search if you put a GPS device on all of our cars, monitored our
movements for a month? You think you're entitled to do that under
your theory?
MR. DREEBEN: The Justices of this Court?
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes.
MR DREEBEN: Under our theory and under this Court's cases,
the Justices of this Court when driving on public roadways have no
greater expectation of-
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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, your answer is yes, you could
tomorrow decide that you put a GPS device on every one of our cars,
follow us for a month; no problem under the Constitution?'
This exchange between the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court and Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben occurred
during the early part of the Government's oral argument in United
States v. Jones.2 Mr. Dreeben's answer, as it unfolded over the
course of questioning by the Chief Justice and several other
Justices, was essentially reducible to the proposition that, when the
Government is monitoring the movements of any person in public
(in this case on the public roadways), there is no constitutional
impediment to tracking a car using a GPS device.' The argument
relies on United States v. Knotts, ' a case in which a radio
transmitter beeper planted in a five gallon drum of chloroform
emitted signals that assisted the Government in physically
following an automobile carrying the drum on public streets,'
where the Court held that "a person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his movements from one place to another." 6 The Global
Positioning System ("GPS") tracking technology at issue in Jones,
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012) (No. 10-1259) (emphasis added), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/10-1259.pdf.
2 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 9-22. Jones noted in his
brief:
GPS devices produce an accurate, continuous, and three-dimensional digital
record of their position and velocity over any period of time-as well as that
of any person or object carrying them. These data can be communicated to a
remote computer through a cellphone connection and translated onto an
interactive map.
Brief for Respondent Antoine Jones at 1, 10, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-
1259) (citing Muhammad U. Iqbal & Samsung Lim, Privacy Implications of
Automated GPS Tracking and Profiling, 29 IEEE TECH. & Soc'Y MAG., no. 2,
2010, at 39, available at http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/snap/publications/
usman&lim2007c.pdf).
4460 U.S. 276 (1980).
'Id. at 278.
6 Id. at 281.
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however, provided the Government with a far more powerful
surveillance tool:
For ... four weeks, the GPS device calculated every movement and
identified every stop Jones made in his vehicle every ten seconds of
every day. Whenever the vehicle moved, the device generated location
and velocity data; whenever the car was not moving, the device went
into sleep mode and sent no data, thus informing law enforcement that
the vehicle and device remained in place. Over the course of a month
of virtually seamless GPS surveillance, the government obtained
satellite-generated data not just about Jones's discrete journeys and
stops, but also patterns of movement and location.7
For anyone in the audience' who had read the Government's
opening brief in Jones, Mr. Dreeben's answer to the Chief Justice's
question was not particularly surprising, ' if palpably
uncomfortable-imagine having to argue to the Supreme Court of
the United States, on behalf of the entire Executive Branch, that
there is no constitutional impediment to the Government's use of
GPS devices to track their cars on public thoroughfares! It was a
captivating moment, at once both humorous and dramatic: Chief
Justice Roberts' hypothetical had threatened the logic of Knotts
and put Dreeben, temporarily at least, on his heels. The question
cut to the core issues before the Court by throwing into high relief
law enforcement's unfettered, indiscriminate ability to track any
individual's movements in public for days, weeks, even months at
a time using a credit card sized GPS device discretely attached to
the undercarriage of a car. "o If there is little to no check (other than
perhaps its better judgment) upon the Government's covert use of
7 Brief for Respondent Antoine Jones, supra note 3, at 4 (internal citations
omitted).
8 The author was present in the audience at the Jones oral argument.
9 See Brief for the United States at 12, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012) (No. 10-1259) (relying on Knotts for the proposition that "technological
enhancements in the ability to observe matters 'knowingly expose[d] to the
public' do not render those observations a search").
10 Chief Justice Roberts describes the GPS tracking technology at issue in
Jones as giving law enforcement the ability to "just sit back in the station" and
"push a button whenever they want to find out where the car is. They look at the
data from a month and find out everywhere it's been in the past month."
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 4.
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GPS devices to monitor the comings and goings of Supreme Court
Justices as they drive down public streets, what does that suggest
about the lawful scope of the Government's ability to track the
movements of regular citizens? Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor
remarks, "The GPS technology [of] today is limited only by the
cost of the instrument, which frankly right now is so small that it
wouldn't take that much of a budget, local budget, to place a GPS
[device] on every car in the nation.""
Likewise, Justice Breyer confronts the Deputy Solicitor
General with his own concerns about the degree of government
power enabled by unconstrained use of tracking technologies:
"[W]hat would a democratic society look like if a large number of
people did think that the government was tracking their every
movement over long periods of time[?]" 2 Presumably in an effort
to prevent this kind of harm, Justice Breyer announces he is
searching for a "reason and principle" that would "reject" this kind
of government surveillance "but wouldn't also reject [government
tracking] 24 hours a day for 28 days,"" the period of surveillance
at issue in Jones.'4
Embedded in Justice Breyer's statements are several of the
critical issues faced by the Jones Court. First, that modern day
location tracking technologies, " beyond just the physical
attachment of GPS tracking devices to cars at issue in Jones," are
enabling surveillance with a level of precision and on a scale
heretofore unimaginable," even in dystopian fiction.'" True, the
" Id. at 25.
12 Id. at 24.
" Id. at 25.
14 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
15 See infra note 39.
16 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948 ("[A]gents installed a GPS tracking device on
the undercarriage of the Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot. Over
the next 28 days, the Government used the device to track the vehicle's
movements.").
'7 See infra note 39.
" Professor Lawrence Lessig observes that "while . . . analogies to Orwell
[George Orwell's 1984] are just about always useless," he makes one important
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Court had acknowledged the potential for dragnet surveillance in
Knotts," but no more than that. In Jones, however, statements
made by some of the Justices at oral argument, 20 along with
elements of the concurrences, 21 evince the Court's general
recognition that, despite the Government's protestations to the
comparison about the difference between today's technologies and the
surveillance technologies in 1984:
While the ends of government in 1984 were certainly vastly more evil than
anything our government would ever pursue, it is interesting to note just
how inefficient, relative to the current range of technologies, Orwell's
technologies were. The central device was a 'telescreen' that both
broadcasted content and monitored behavior on the other side. But the great
virtue of the telescreen was that you knew what it, in principle, could see.
Winston knew where to hide, because the perspective of the telescreen was
transparent. It was easy to know what it couldn't see, and hence easy to
know where to do the stuff you didn't want to see. That's not the world we
live in today. You can't know whether your search on the Internet is being
monitored. You don't know whether a camera is trying to identify who you
are. Your telephone doesn't make funny clicks as the NSA listens in ....
The technologies of today have none of the integrity of the technologies of
1984. None are decent enough to let you know when your life is being
recorded.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 208-09 (Soho Books 2010); see also United States
v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011), a pre-Jones decision involving
sixty hours of warrantless GPS tracking of the defendant's car by the
Government, where Judge Wood observed that "[t]he technological devices
available for such monitoring have rapidly attained a degree of accuracy that
would have been unimaginable to an earlier generation. They make the system
that George Orwell depicted in his famous novel, 1984, seem clumsy and easily
avoidable by comparison." Id. at 286 (Wood, J. dissenting).
19 Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 at n.6 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,
284 (1983)). ("Knotts noted the 'limited use which the government made of the
signals from this particular beeper;' and reserved the question whether 'different
constitutional principles may be applicable' to dragnet-type law enforcement
practices' of the type made possible here, ibid.")
20 See Justice Sotomayor's statement referencing the low cost of GPS
surveillance that could permit the tracking of every car in the nation at supra
note 11 and accompanying text. See also Chief Justice Robert's characterization
of the Government's argument as allowing GPS tracking of individuals with no
reason, suspicion, or limitation. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at
15.
21 See discussion infra Part II.
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contrary, w2 e are now in a technological age where mass
surveillance can and perhaps does occur.23
Second, Justice Breyer recognizes implicitly that such large-
scale government surveillance can influence the behavior of
individual citizens in a manner and on a scale that threatens the
functioning of a democratic society. More than forty years ago,
Vice President Hubert Humphrey had similarly observed that
"[w]e act differently if we believe we are being observed. If we
can never be sure whether or not we are being watched and
listened to, all our actions will be altered and our very character
will change."24 Significantly, the iconic literary expression of a
surveillance dystopia, Orwell's 1984,25 was referenced six times
during the Jones oral argument.2 6 Moreover, in her concurring
opinion, Justice Sotomayor writes, "GPS monitoring-by making
available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of
intimate information about any person whom the Government, in
its unfettered discretion, chooses to track-may 'alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is
inimical to democratic society.' "27 Indeed, Justice Sotomayor not
only recognizes the likely existence of mass surveillance, but also
seems to be gesturing toward a theory of the resultant harm it could
cause to our institutions in the form of a politically demoralized
citizenry.
22 During oral argument, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben suggested that
"the Court should address the so-called 1984 scenarios if they come to pass,
rather using this case as a vehicle for doing so." Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 1, at 25.
23 See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) ("The new
[surveillance] technologies enable, as the old (because of expense) do not,
wholesale surveillance. . . . Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by
enabling an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been
prohibitively expensive.").
24 Hubert H. Humphrey, Foreword to EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS viii
(1967).
25 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic 1990) (1949).
26 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 13, 25, 27, 33, 35, 57.
27 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir.
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
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Third, Justice Breyer's statements illustrate a recognition that
any rule or principle chosen to curb the Government's location
tracking surveillance power must nevertheless account for law
enforcement's need to investigate crimes.28 Recognizing that some
form of social harm is inherent in pervasive monitoring, Justice
Breyer searches for a rule that would allow lawful government
tracking short of such injurious mass surveillance, while
nevertheless permitting the twenty-eight days of surveillance that
occurred in Jones or, presumably, some shorter period of
tracking. 29 Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, however, warns
against the "intolerable ... line drawing problems" the Court could
create through the language of its decision.3 0 Indeed, this type of
specific "line-drawing" does sound like work more appropriately
left to the legislative process-at least an exasperated Justice
Scalia seemed to conclude as much during oral argument when he
exclaimed, more than rhetorically, "Don't we have any legislatures
out there that could stop this stuff?"3 '
Ultimately, the Jones Court held unanimously that the
Government's GPS tracking of the Jeep driven by Antoine Jones
was a search under the Fourth Amendment.32 As illustrated by the
majority and two concurring opinions, however, the Justices are in
disagreement with regard to both the facts and the rationale
supporting this conclusion.33 Indeed, if the Court's opinion in
Jones is to be assessed as an attempt to create a clear rule or
principle that sets appropriate limits on the Government's power to
track the movements of its citizens with various types of location
28 See, e.g., Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me
Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location
Data That Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 151-56 (2012)
(discussing how imposing a unitary probable cause standard for law
enforcement access to all location data generated by cell phones can unduly
limit law enforcement activities at early stages in an investigation).
29 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 13-15.
'
0 Id. at 25.
' Id. at 26.
32 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit with a 9-0 vote).
3 See discussion infra Part II.
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technologies, yet enables law enforcement to use such tracking
tools effectively in its investigations, the decision must be seen as a
noble failure. 34 In accordance with Justice Alito's concurring
opinion and relevant scholarship, however, this Article presumes
that this kind of specific line drawing-especially when it seeks to
address the nuanced balancing of law enforcement, privacy and
industry interests invoked by the Government's use of powerful
and quickly evolving technologies to gain access to
information"-is an effort that is best left to legislatures." In
stating this conclusion, however, this Article does not suggest that
courts and the Fourth Amendment have no role to play with
respect to protecting individuals from the unreasonable searches
and seizures that may result from government use of new
surveillance technologies. Rather, it proceeds with the implicit
recognition that such Fourth Amendment protections will
inevitably develop incrementally over time as courts attempt, with
judicial, not legislative, tools, "to help restore the prior level of
privacy protection" that existed before new technologies and social
practices "ma[de] evidence substantially easier for the government
to obtain.""
34 See, e.g., Pell & Soghoian, supra note 28, at 134-50 (discussing the lack of
clarity and guidance offered by the Jones opinions with respect to legal
standards governing law enforcement access to location data generated by cell
phones and arguing that the Alito concurrence intensifies the confusion in the
law surrounding current law enforcement access standards).
3 Id. at 15 1 (arguing that in order to save courts from the "difficult acts of
legal navigation" raised by determining the appropriate legal standards for law
enforcement access to cell phone location data during the current pace of
technological change, "policy makers should enact laws containing clear
standards that strike the right balance among law enforcement needs and privacy
and industry interests").
36 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) ("In circumstances involving
dramatic technological change, the best solutions to privacy concerns may be
legislative." (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 801, 805-06 (2004) (arguing that Congress should be the primary driver of
privacy protections when technology "is in flux"))).
3 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011).
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What Jones does offer, both through the arguments of the
concurring opinions and a larger political message emanating from
the very lack of controlling doctrine for any kind of location
tracking that does not involve physical trespass, is a recognition
that there is a need for a new privacy mandate that will respond
adequately to the breadth of the Government's capacity, through
the use of various location tracking technologies, "to ascertain,
more or less at will [the] political and religious beliefs [and] sexual
habits" of its citizens. " Indeed, the ambit of this recognition
actually extends beyond the GPS tracking device at issue in Jones
to other types of tracking or surveillance technologies and methods
referenced in the case," including Justice Sotomayor's questioning
of the appropriateness of the third party doctrine for the digital
age.40 This doctrine stands for the premise that "an individual has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
38Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
3 Id. at 957 ("People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their
cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which
they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and
medications they purchase to online retailers."); id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring)
("In some locales, closed-circuit television video monitoring is becoming
ubiquitous. On toll roads, automatic toll collection systems create a precise
record of the movements of motorists who choose to make use of that
convenience. Many motorists purchase cars that are equipped with devices that
permit a central station to ascertain the car's location at any time so that roadside
assistance may be provided if needed and the car may be found if it is stolen.
Perhaps most significant, cell phones and other wireless devices now permit
wireless carriers to track and record the location of users-and as of June 2011,
it has been reported, there were more than 322 million wireless devices in use in
the United States. For older phones, the accuracy of the location information
depends on the density of the tower network, but new 'smart phones,' which are
equipped with a GPS device, permit more precise tracking. For example, when
a user activates the GPS on such a phone, a provider is able to monitor the
phone's location and speed of movement and can then report back real-time
traffic conditions after combining ('crowdsourcing') the speed of all such
phones on any particular road. Similarly, phone-location-tracking services are
offered as 'social' tools, allowing consumers to find (or to avoid) others who
enroll in these services.").4 0 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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disclosed to third parties."41 Perhaps more than any other single
legal precedent, the third party doctrine facilitates warrantless
government access to an ever-growing cache of information about
individuals stored by third parties 42 who themselves have
developed enormously sophisticated and accurate tracking
technologies for commercial purposes.4 3
How such a mandate will take shape is not yet certain. For
instance, how will courts and legislatures go about limiting the
third party doctrine or otherwise curbing government surveillance
powers post-Jones? Justice Scalia, as mentioned, points to the role
of elected legislatures as crucial and implies that they have been
lax in addressing the issues." Indeed, Congress has made little
progress towards providing clear rules that set appropriate limits
on the Government's power to track the movements of its citizens
with various types of location technologies. 45 But courts and
legislatures are not the only parties to this process. Another player
is taking the field in the form of code itself-that is, in the
new(ish) technologies which limit the Government's ability to
41 Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
42 See generally Stephanie K. Pell, Systematic Access to Private Sector Data
in the United States, 2 INT'L DATA PRIVACY LAW, no. 4, 2012, at 247, available
at http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/ipsO2O?ijkey-KkPfBFLbuMnUYsR
&keytype=ref (discussing, for example, gaps in various statutory schemes
enacted to create some level of privacy protection for third party data not
afforded Fourth Amendment protection).
43 Julie Angwin, The Web's New Goldmine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J. (July
30, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703940904575395
073512989404.html (discussing the fact that commercial consumer tracking
technologies are getting smarter and more intrusive); see also Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Ashkan Soltani, Nathaniel Good, Dietrich J. Wambach & Mika D.
Ayenson, Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L. &
POL' REV. 273 (2012) (explaining, for example, that "tailoring advertising-has
become politically controversial because in order to pitch relevant advertising to
individuals, companies have strong incentives to monitor individuals' use of the
Internet pervasively and to build profiles of users").
44 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 26; see supra Part I; infra
Part IV.
45 See discussion infra Part II.D.
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access certain types of content and non-content communications,
even when a Court has authorized the collection of such
information.4 These encryption and anonymization technologies
offer their own form of implicit, incremental regulation insofar as
they can prevent the Government from obtaining certain types of
communications altogether or force the Government to get that
information through far more labor intensive and expensive
alternative methods. 47 By forcing the Government to try a little
harder or spend a little more to obtain each unit of surveillance
information, these technologies may reintroduce a needed measure
of new friction into a digital age that has-for some time now-
steadily facilitated law enforcement access to the point where it has
arguably become too cheap and too easy.4 8
Part II of this Article discusses the three Jones opinions,
summarizing some of their significant shortcomings and placing
them within the context of the larger legal and policy debate about
location tracking. Part II continues with an analysis of the Jones
Court's call for a privacy mandate and its suggestions of how that
mandate might emerge from its own future cases if a legislative
solution is not found first, which is underscored both through the
concerns expressed by Justices Sotomayor and Alito in their
respective concurring opinions and through a larger political
message emanating from the majority opinion's lack of doctrinal
guidance. Part III, borrowing from Lawrence Lessig's contention
46 See discussion infra Part III.
47 See id.
48 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) ("[B]ecause GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the
ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: 'limited
police resources and community hostility.' "); see also Christopher Soghoian,
The Spies We Trust: Third Party Service Providers and Law Enforcement
Surveillance (Aug. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Informatics, Indiana University), available at http://files.dubfire.net/csoghoian-
dissertation-final-8-1-2012.pdf (explaining that "mass adoption of digital
technologies over the past decade has led to a radical shift in the government's
ability to engage in large scale surveillance").
500 [VOL. 14: 489
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that "code is law," 4 discusses two specific encryption and
anonymization technologies and describes how, for better or worse,
they can make law enforcement's job harder, then goes on to place
them within the context of the larger congressional public policy
debate. Finally, Part IV concludes that, at least in the short run,
these types of encryption and anonymization technologies promise
a surer, quicker path or "fix" to certain aspects of the privacy
mandate some are "Jonesing" for today.
II. MOSAICS, THIRD PARTIES, AND VERY TINY CONSTABLES
This Part first examines some of the limits of the majority
opinion in Jones, as well as aspects of the Jones opinions that
create particular challenges for lower courts, law enforcement, and
industry with respect to determining the appropriate legal standards
for law enforcement access to location data generated by cellular
phones." While the Jones facts did not involve law enforcement
access to and use of cell phone location data," the Jones opinions
clearly illustrate the Justices' appreciation of the pending cell
phone tracking issue, whether or not it can be resolved
immediately by the Court.52 Indeed, as this Part will discuss, the
Jones decision arose during a still ongoing public policy debate
before Congress over the appropriate standards for law
enforcement access to location data." Finally, this Part analyzes
the call for action by some or multiple branches of government-
found both in the concurring opinions and in the majority opinion's
49 LESSIG, supra note 18, at 5; see discussion infra Part III.
5o For an explanation of the various ways cell phones generate location data
see Pell & Soghoian, supra note 28, at 126-33.
5 The Government also obtained location data from Antoine Jones's cell
phone and, having defeated Jones's motion to suppress evidence, intends to use
it as evidence in a re-trial of Jones. United States v. Jones, No. 05-0386 (ESH),
2012 WL 6443136 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Suhrith Parthasarathy, Federal
Judge Allows Warrantless Use of Cell Phone Location Data, Thomson Reuters
News & Insight, THOMSON REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/12 - December/
Federaljudgeallows warrantless use of cellphonelocation data/.
52 See discussion infra Part II.D.
5 See discussion infra Part II.D.
SPRING 2013] 501
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
lack of doctrine addressing location tracking not involving physical
trespass-for appropriate mechanisms to limit the Government's
often unfettered access to information in the digital age.
A. The Majority Opinion and Justice Alito's Concurrence
In the Jones majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia, four
other Justices 5 joined in holding that the "Government's
installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of
that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a
'search.' "" Further defining the offending conduct, the majority
opinion states, "The Government physically occupied private
property for the purpose of obtaining information." "
Consequently, though "[t]respass alone does not qualify [as a
search]," a search does occur when it is "conjoined with . . . an
attempt to find something or to obtain information."" The "key to
the decision, [however,] is the predicate trespass" and, if such
trespass occurs, "the fact that third parties can observe the vehicle
is irrelevant."" Indeed, Knotts holds that information voluntarily
conveyed to the public does not violate the Katz 5 9 reasonable
expectation of privacy test 60 and thus does not render the
Government's collection of such information a search. This
conclusion is more or less still intact post-Jones,6 1 since the Jones
54 Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor joined.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). The Court, however, did
not decide whether the search was reasonable, and thus lawful, under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 954. It therefore remains unclear as to whether a warrant is
required for the Government's future use of GPS tracking devices.
56 Id. at 949.
" Id. at 951 n.5.
58 Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J.
OF CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 2, 3 (2012).
59 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
60 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) ("As Justice Harlan's oft-
quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes
as reasonable." (citing United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))).
61 Jones, 132 S. Ct at 951-52 ("We said that there has been no infringement of
Knotts' reasonable expectation of privacy since the information obtained-the
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majority opinion reconciles the two decisions by noting that the
Katz test "added to, not substituted for, the common law
trespassory test,"6 2 while Knotts addressed the Katz test only.63
Justice Scalia, while not repudiating the reasonable expectation of
privacy test, reasoned that the Fourth Amendment must be
interpreted to "assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." " To
accomplish a return to the status quo by preserving that particular
degree of privacy, Justice Scalia "interpreted the Fourth
Amendment as protecting against common law trespasses." 6
Accordingly, the Government's attachment of the GPS device with
the intent to gather information was a common law trespass and,
therefore, a Fourth Amendment search.66
Insofar as Jones's Fourth Amendment rights "did not rise or
fall with the Katz formulation"" of what constitutes a search, the
Court's trespass-based theory was a way to address the
Government's unfettered ability to attach GPS tracking devices to
cars and monitor movements on public roads without delving into
how the Fourth Amendment might appropriately limit government
use of other types of tracking technologies that solely employ the
transmission of radio or other electronic signals not enabled by the
Government's direct physical trespass-such as tracking a target's
location of the automobile carrying the container on public roads, and the
location of the off-loaded container in open fields near Knotts' cabin-had been
voluntarily conveyed to the public.")621 d. at 952.
63 Id. ("The holding in Knotts addressed only the former [Katz test], since the
latter [trespass] was not at issue. The beeper had been placed in the container
before it came into Knotts' possession, with the consent of the then-owner.
Knotts did not challenge that installation, and we specifically declined to
consider its effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis." (citations omitted)).
64Id at 946 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34).
65 Orin S. Kerr, Defending Equilibrium-Adjustment, 125 HARV. L. REv. F. 84,
88 (2012).
66 Id. For a critique of the Majority's trespass analysis, see Peter A. Winn,
Trespass and the Fourth Amendment: Some Reflections on Jones,
USvJONES.COM (June 4, 2012), available at http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/
trespass-and-the-fourth-amendment-some-reflections-on-jones/.
6 7Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950.
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cell phone. 68 Indeed, Justice Alito criticizes the majority's
trespass-based approach because, among other things:
[It] largely disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for
long-term tracking) and instead attaches great significance to
something that most would view as relatively minor (attaching to the
bottom of a car a small, light object that does not interfere in any way
with the car's operation).69
While Justice Alito agrees that the Court must ensure that
individuals are afforded the same degree of privacy existing in or
around 1789, he questions the majority's rather tenuous reliance on
analogous eighteenth century situations to address this twenty-first
century surveillance issue.70  He humorously sketches the "very
tiny constable" or "gigantic coach" necessary to permit the
eighteenth century version of GPS tracking (that is, the constable
hiding in the coach-unbeknownst to the occupants-to monitor
its and their movements).
In contrast to the pre-computer age, when significant privacy
protections were more practical because the work of surveillance
itself required more human labor, such as "a large team of agents,
multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance," 72 new
technologies like GPS-enabled smart phones 73 and GPS tracking
devices "make long-term monitoring relatively easy and cheap,"74
thus increasing the Government's surveillance powers. In Justice
Alito's view, society's expectation has been that law enforcement
neither had nor could "secretly monitor and catalogue every single
movement of an individual's car" over a long period of time.
Thus, under the Katz test, long-term monitoring, in this case four
weeks of surveillance, was a Fourth Amendment search insofar as
61 Id. at 953 ("Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass would remain subject to the Katz analysis.").
69 Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).
'
0 Id. at 958.
Id. at n.3.
72 Id. at 963.
7 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
7 Id.
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it "exceeded pre-GPS societal expectations that such invasive
monitoring was" at least "unlikely," if not "impossible."76
In determining that four weeks of surveillance is a search,
however, Justice Alito does not find it necessary to identify the
precise point at which the GPS tracking becomes a search, but
merely professes that the line was "surely crossed before the 4-
week mark." n Moreover, Justice Alito writes that it is not
necessary to consider whether long term tracking in investigations
"involving extraordinary offenses" would violate the Katz test
since he surmises that, in such significant cases, the Government
has already engaged in long-term tracking with techniques that
existed before GPS tracking was available." His logic appears to
suggest that, while perhaps with respect to some unnamed group of
extraordinary offenses, societal expectations might contemplate the
use of long-term tracking, no such expectation is commonly held
with respect to investigations of most offenses.
The majority opinion takes Justice Alito to task on these issues,
first for the proposition, which finds no precedent in the law, that
the determination of whether a search occurs somehow depends on
the type or nature of the crime being investigated." Justice Scalia
is equally critical of the line drawing problems that occur as a
result of the rather arbitrary declaration that four weeks of GPS
monitoring in a drug investigation is " 'surely' too long."o How
does the Court make such determinations with, for example, two
days of GPS tracking in a stolen electronics investigation or six
months of monitoring a terrorism suspect?" Indeed, the majority
opinion identifies one of the most "vexing problems"82 inherent in
Justice Alito's attempt to draw distinctions between short-term and
long-term monitoring and apply them to the types of investigations
where such electronic tracking techniques are used: the problem of
76 Kerr, supra note 65, at 89.
77 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
78 Id.
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finding an interpretive principle that enlists the Fourth Amendment
in making such distinctions but avoids mere arbitrary line drawing.
Even Justice Alito acknowledges that the best the Court can do in
any case is "to apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and ask
whether the use of GPS tracking in [that] particular case involved a
degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have
anticipated."" With this recognition, Justice Alito suggests that
legislatures, not the judiciary, may be best suited to address
privacy concerns arising from new technologies that expand
government power.84
Justice Alito's exercise in line-drawing (or the lack thereof),
premised on the theory that relatively short-term tracking comports
with citizens' reasonable expectations of privacy whereas long-
term tracking does not, is actually an attempt to introduce a new
interpretive method into the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. 8 First introduced in the D.C. Circuit opinion
United States v. Maynard," Professor Orin Kerr calls this new
approach the "mosaic theory.""
B. The Mosaic Theory
"At present, the mosaic theory is little more than a name,"" but
it has the potential to be a disruptive element to Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Prior to the Supreme Court's review in
Jones, the Maynard court considered whether the Government's
warrantless use of a GPS device placed on a vehicle to track a
suspect's movements for twenty-eight days, twenty-four hours a
day was an unreasonable search.89 In concluding that the long-
83 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., dissenting).
84 id.
85 See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH.
L. REv. 311, 327 (2012).
86 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh'g denied sub nom. United States v.
Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
87 Kerr, supra note 85, at 313.
88 Slobogin, supra note 58, at 4.
89 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555.
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term GPS surveillance of movements exposed to public view was a
search, the court explained:
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by
short term surveillance . . . [that] can each reveal more about a person
than does any individual trip viewed in isolation . . . . A person who
knows all of another's travels can deduce whether he is a weekly
church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful
husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of
particular individuals or political groups-and not just one such fact
about a person, but all such facts.90
As Professor Kerr observes, under the mosaic theory, a court
determines whether government conduct is a search "not by
whether a particular individual act is a search, but rather whether
an entire course of conduct, viewed collectively, amounts to a
search." 9' Individual acts that may not, in their own right, be
searches can become searches when committed in particular
combinations. 92 For example, in Maynard, the court does not look
at individual data records from the GPS device to determine
whether individual trips are searches." Instead, "the court looks at
the entirety of surveillance over a one-month period and views it as
one single 'thing' " subject to Fourth Amendment analysis.94
In an Article providing an exhaustive critique of the mosaic
theory, Professor Kerr argues that the theory challenges the
Supreme Court's established methods for analyzing when a Fourth
Amendment search occurs and whether the search is reasonable.95
90 Id. at 562.
91 See Orin S. Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces "Mosaic Theory" of Fourth
Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH






9 Kerr, supra note 85. This Article does not provide a full accounting of
Professor Kerr's critique of the mosaic theory. Rather, it highlights particular
elements of the critique that are useful to this Article's discussion of some of the




He explains that, in determining when police action constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search, courts have traditionally focused on
"each 'particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal
security,' starting with the 'initial' step and then separately
analyzing the 'subsequent' steps." 96 He calls this form of analysis
the "sequential approach" and gives the example of an officer
inserting a key into the door of a residence, opening the door,
seeing an expensive piece of stereo equipment, moving the
equipment to look at the serial number and then recording the
serial number. " In this scenario, courts will analyze each
particular outlined step as its "own Fourth Amendment event ...
evaluated independently of the others."9 8
The sequential approach also shapes the analysis of whether
the search conduct is constitutionally reasonable.99 Upon finding
that a Fourth Amendment search has occurred, courts then evaluate
whether the search is reasonable. There are two competing
approaches for determining whether a search is reasonable. The
traditional approach would only find a search to be reasonable
when law enforcement has secured a warrant based on probable
cause,"oo absent a special exception to the warrant requirement.101
More recently, however, the Court has suggested a different
approach: "Reasonableness now is understood as requiring a
balancing of interests: courts consider whether the government
interests advanced by the use of an investigatory technique
96 Id at 316 (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1973)).
9 7 Id at 315-16.
" Id at 316.
99 Id. at 317-18.
100 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) (listing categories of probable cause: "(1)
evidence of a crime; (2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally
possessed; (3) property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing
a crime; or (4) a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained").
101 Kerr, supra note 85, at 318 (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51
(1951) ("Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. Only where incident to a
valid arrest, or in 'exceptional circumstances,' may an exemption lie, and then
the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it." (citations
omitted) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948)))).
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outweigh the privacy interest that its use threatens." 102 This
balancing approach can result in the requirement of a warrant,
some lesser form of regulation, or perhaps no regulation at all.10 3
But under both approaches, "reasonableness rest[s] on the
assumption that searches are readily identifiable acts that occur
over readily identifiable periods of time."
It is not hard to appreciate that the mosaic theory-which looks
not at single acts, but which aggregates an entire course of
conduct-has the potential to wreak havoc on the process by which
courts determine whether a search has occurred and, if it has,
whether it was reasonable. At what point and on what basis should
a court determine, for instance, that a single act or series of acts
amount to the prolonged surveillance that triggers the mosaic
theory? And how does a prosecutor, judge or defense attorney
recognize the phenomenon? Moreover, investigations proceed
over time, unfolding sequentially like narrative fiction. As such,
once begun, they are simultaneously prospective and retrospective,
with each new fact having the potential both to refine the direction
of the investigation's forward course and correct previous
102 Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) ("We must
balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests
alleged to justify the intrusion.")); see also Sampson v. California 547 U.S. 843,
848 (2006) (" [U]nder our general Fourth Amendment approach we examin[e]
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a search is reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."); Kerr, supra note 85, at 318.
Whether a search is reasonable "is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests." Id. at 318-19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103 Kerr, supra note 85, at 318 (citing Sampson, 547 U.S. at 848).
104 Id at 318-19. Professor Kerr also argues that the sequential approach
"forms the foundation of the warrant requirement" insofar as the Fourth
Amendment's warrant clause has a particularity requirement that limits searches
by requiring that they occur at a particular place and that the Government's
searches for specific types of evidence, all that must be identified in the warrant.
Id. at 319. The sequential approach has "obvious force" because the
particularity requirement is "premise[d]" on the fact that "searches are discrete
things that can occur in discrete places to find discrete items." Id.
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erroneous assumptions. How would the mosaic theory regulate the
integration of several investigative techniques, each of which
individually might not constitute a search but which nevertheless
could, when aggregated together with other techniques, help create
the kind of intimate picture of a person's life that the Maynard
court sought to protect from undue scrutiny?'os Accordingly, the
Solicitor General has argued in the Government's Jones brief that
"the 'mosaic' theory is unworkable. Law enforcement officers
could not predict when their observations of public movements
would yield a larger pattern and convert legitimate short-term
surveillance into a search. Courts would be hard pressed to
pinpoint that moment, even in retrospect.""o0
Notwithstanding the problematic implications of the mosaic
theory, the concurring opinions in Jones suggest that, in some
future case, there may be five votes for a mosaic-type Fourth
Amendment theory holding that "the use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy."'O" While Justice Sotomayor did not join
1os See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
("Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and
what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about
a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a
church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does
one's not visiting any of these places over the course of a month. The sequence
of a person's movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist's
office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a
visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of
another's travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy
drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving
medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups-and
not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts." (internal citations
omitted)).
106 Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012) (No. 10-1259). Indeed, Respondent Jones did not employ the Maynard
"mosaic theory" in his brief to the Supreme Court. See Brief for Respondent
Antoine Jones, supra note 3, at 45.
"o' Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Kagan joined Justice Alito's concurrence. See id.
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the Alito concurrence, in her own she states, "I agree with Justice
Alito that, at the very least, 'longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.' "'
C. A Call for a New Privacy Mandate
Justice Sotomayor joined the Jones majority opinion, not the
Alito concurrence.' 9 In doing so, she writes that "the majority's
opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the
Government physically invades personal property to gather
information, a search occurs."'" For her, "The reaffirmation of
that principle suffices to decide this case."'" But her support for
the opinion, which (merely) affirms the "constitutional relevance"
of the Government's physical trespass on private property," 2 does
not end her analysis of the privacy interests and expectations at
issue with respect to other forms of government surveillance that
do not require such physical intrusion."' Indeed, she notes that
Justice Alito is correct in observing that nontrespassory
surveillance techniques will "affect the Katz test by shaping the
evolution of societal privacy expectations."" 4 She therefore agrees
that, "at the very least, 'longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.' ""'
Having qualified the two other Jones opinions as, more or less,
addressing constitutional minimums, Justice Sotomayor ventures
further to suggest that, in investigations employing "even short-
108 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
109 See supra note 54 and infra note 112.
"o Jones, 132 S. Ct at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
1 Id.
112 Id. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor criticizes the Alito concurrence for
"discount[ing] altogether the constitutional relevance of the Government's
physical intrusion on Jones' Jeep," thereby "erod[ing] that longstanding
protection for privacy expectations inherent in items of property that people
possess or control." Id.
" Id.
114 Id.
" Id. (emphasis added).
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term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance
relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention.""'
For her, the privacy interests at issue with GPS monitoring include
the Government's ability to ascertain "a precise, comprehensive
record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of
detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.""1 . She also recognizes that once recorded and
stored, the Government can "mine" such information, perhaps for
that person's lifetime and beyond. "' Indeed, depending on time
frames of storage, "9 it may become impossible to ever escape
one's past. Moreover, she asserts that because government use of
GPS monitoring is surreptitious and "cheap" when compared with
other traditional methods of surveillance, it evades some of the
"checks" or sources of friction in the system that "constrain
116 d.
117 id.
"' Id. at 956.
119 Consider the congressional testimony of Professor Matt Blaze given in
response to a question posed by Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) about data
retention practices of mobile service providers:
Mr. NADLER. [ ... ] What is the technological necessity and what is the
practice of retaining this information? In other words they need to know
where you are now so they can route the call. Do they need to know where
you were an hour ago or a day ago? And do they retain this information?
And if so, why?
Mr. BLAZE. Well, every service provider-I should say I am not
speaking for any service provider, and every service provider will have its
own practices-but in general, service providers record everything
essentially forever. This information is extraordinarily valuable for
business, marketing and technical purposes. It tells them where their
network needs to be improved, were dead spots are, and how their
customers use their phones.
ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 16 (2010) [hereinafter
ECPA Reform Hearing], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
printers/1 11th/ 1 1-10957082.pdf.
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abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and
community hostility."1 20
Justice Sotomayor's succinct analysis of the privacy
implications of GPS monitoring, which encompasses location
tracking beyond the physical attachment of GPS devices,
highlights some of the most significant privacy concerns in the
digital age: data mining,121 the relative strength of access standards,
data acquisition practices so cheap and easy they can facilitate
abusive police activities,12  and a limitless flow of third party data
law enforcement can use to expose or reconstruct the intimate
details of a person's life.'23 Indeed, Justice Sotomayor warns that
such cheap, unfettered access to broad swaths of intimate
information "may alter the relationship between citizen and
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society." 24 For
her, then, such technology, which is generating the Government's
increasingly clear sense of sight with regard to the lives of
individuals, facilitates a power shift that is fundamentally
inhibitory to open participation in a democratic society.
Drawing on the work of several scholars, Professor Paul Ohm
argues that the fundamental goals of the Fourth Amendment
should be limiting government power and preserving each citizen's
10.Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v.
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
121 See Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal
Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435 (2008) (describing the large
volume and variety of personal data to which the Government has access and
examining the absence of any meaningful limits on that access).
122 See Pell, supra note 42 (discussing gaps in various privacy statutes and
government practices which, for example, facilitated the FBI's abuse of national
security letters).
123 See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment In A World Without Privacy, 81
Miss. L.J. 1309, 1318-21 (2012) (describing four technological trends "which
enable a powerful, new surveillance society" and arguing that such trends are
facilitating law enforcement's "shift from being active producers of surveillance
to passive consumers, essentially outsource all of their surveillance activities to
private third parties").
124.Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States
v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
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liberty. 125 Indeed, he asserts that the Fourth Amendment was
"originally intended and is better interpreted to ensure not privacy,
but liberty from undue government power."' 2 6 In support of this
argument, Professor Ohm draws from the work of some
constitutional scholars who employ an originalist interpretive
frame-that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect colonists
from the Crown's use of general warrants, which entitled British
troops to search indiscriminately and without suspicion.'2 7 In the
digital age, law enforcement is relying more and more on "private
surveillance,"'2 8 that is, upon data held by non-government third
parties, to fuel its investigations.'2 9 A great deal of such data is
shielded from Fourth Amendment protection because we have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. 130 Professor Ohm predicts that,
ultimately, law enforcement "will shift their time, energy, and
money away from self-help policing [and] becom[e] passive
consumers rather than active producers of surveillance." '
Accordingly, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test will
continue to become less relevant for purposes of implementing
125 Paul Ohm, Three Fixes for the Fourth Amendment after Jones,
USvJONES.COM (June 2, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/02/three-fixes-for-
the-fourth-amendment-after-jones/#more-152 (citing DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING
To HIDE 114 (2011); see also Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the
Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 555, 618-19 (1996)); Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty:
The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56 (2009); Jed
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008); William J.
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 446
(1995);.
126 Ohm, supra note 123, at 1311-12.
127 Id. at 1334 (citing Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles
in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REv. 199, 296-97 (1993)).
128 Ohm, supra note 125.
129 See id.
130 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976).
131 Ohm, supra note 125.
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Fourth Amendment protections in the digital age. 132 Indeed,
Professor Ohm suggests that the Fourth Amendment already exists
in world without privacy, so what is left for Katz to protect? 33 He
therefore calls for a "shift away from Katz's reasonable
expectation of privacy to rules that focus instead on the balance of
power between the police and the people." 34
Notwithstanding the fact that Justice Sotomayor appears to
focus on the Katz test for purposes of examining and curbing the
expanded government power afforded by GPS tracking
technologies,135 she suggests that, "More fundamentally, it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties."' 3 1 She notes that "[p]eople disclose the
phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the
URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books,
groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers." 3 1
Cognizant of the fact that the Fourth Amendment provides little to
no limit on government acquisition of this information, she is
skeptical of Justice Alito's observance that people may find the
"tradeoff of privacy for convenience worthwhile" (e.g., we
willingly generate more constitutionally non-protected third party
data for the convenience of mobile devices) and that we have come
to accept this "diminution of privacy as inevitable." 13 On the
contrary, she suggests that this "trade" is not self-conscious and
informed in a manner that could support his conclusions. '3' As
such, she does not accept either the conclusions themselves or the
132 Ohm, supra note 123, at 1336-39 ("[T]he age of using privacy as a
measuring stick for Fourth Amendment protection is likely soon to draw to a
close.").
'
3 1 Id. at 1334.
134 Id. at 1334-35.
"3 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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general idea of "treat[ing] secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy" for
purposes of receiving Fourth Amendment protections.140
Professor Ohm describes this phenomenon as "mark[ing] the
beginning of the end of the third party doctrine."41 Perhaps more
importantly, he writes that the Sotomayor concurrence "begins to
embrace the move away from privacy to power and liberty." 42 But
how such a move will further materialize remains to be seen. Will
the Court move away from or supplement the Katz test? 43 Will it
revisit Knotts? 144 Will it reexamine and limit the third party
doctrine? One thing seems relatively certain: None of these
possible changes or additions to Fourth Amendment doctrine will
happen quickly.14
D. The Political Message of Jones and the Larger Public Policy
Debate
The Court's unanimous holding that the Government's
installation of a GPS device on Antoine Jones's Jeep and
subsequent tracking of his vehicle for twenty-eight days was a
search should first be understood as a win for the respondent.' 46
That result, or some tally of votes which would have overturned
Jones's conviction, no matter how the Court found its way there,
was, of course, the duty and primary goal of his counsel. "47
140 id
141 Ohm, supra note 125.
142 id.
143 See supra note 60.
144 See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
145 See Susan Freiwald, The Davis Good Faith Rule and Getting Answers to
the Questions Jones Left Open, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 341 (observing that the
Supreme Court has not addressed location tracking since the Knotts and Karo
cases from the 1980s and explaining that "[a] review of lower court decisions in
the wake of Jones reveals that, rather than beginning to answer the questions
Jones left open, courts are largely avoiding substantive Fourth Amendment
analysis of location data privacy").
146 Walter Dellinger, Keynote Address at the North Carolina Journal of Law
& Technology Symposium: U.S. v. Jones: Defining a Search in the 21st
Century (Jan. 25, 2013), available at http://ncjolt.org/multimedia/symposium-
videos.
147 id
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Beyond this immediate win, it is hard not to interpret the
unanimous vote as the Court's unequivocal repudiation of the
unfettered, indiscriminate tracking that the Government asserted
was constitutionally permissible when using a GPS device to
monitor movements on public roadways. The Court, however,
held back on delivering a majority opinion that constrains
government use of tracking technologies that do not depend on
physical trespass-like cell phones or tablets.'48 One can speculate
as to why it did not venture into this territory. The simple answer
may be, as Justice Scalia and Justice Sotomayor both suggest, the
facts before the Court did not require it to resolve some of the
"vexing problems" that location tracking-absent physical
trespass-present. 149
Such "vexing problems" left open by Jones majority are,
however, pressing issues for lower courts, as well as the Executive
and Legislative branches of government.'o Moreover, the political
message emanating from the lack of controlling doctrine with
respect to location tracking that does not involve physical trespass
should not be discounted as merely a question left unanswered by
the Court in Jones. Indeed, "unanswered" should not be
interpreted to mean "unaddressed" altogether, since the very threat
148 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) ("Situations involving
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain
subject to the Katz analysis.").
149 Id. at 954 ("We may have to grapple with these 'vexing problems' in some
future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be
had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them
here."); id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[T]he trespassory test applied in
the majority's opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the
Government physically invades personal property to gather information, a
search occurs. The reaffirmation of that principle suffices to decide this case.").
15o See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 28 (describing how the legal mystery
surrounding the proper law enforcement access standard for prospective and
historical location data remains unsolved which has created, along with
conflicting rulings over the appropriate law enforcement access standard for
both prospective and historical location data, a messy, inconsistent legal
landscape where even judges in the same district may require law enforcement
to meet different standards before authorizing law enforcement to compel
location data).
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of doctrine to follow-perhaps some formulation of the mosaic
theory-is arguably a powerful signal to law enforcement that it
must make its own efforts to resolve the prevailing uncertainty,
whether through internal self-scrutiny or earnest participation in
the legislative process. In the wake of Jones, for example, the FBI
General Counsel expressed the difficulty government lawyers now
face in providing guidance to law enforcement officers with
respect to the type of legal process needed to compel or acquire
various types of location data or execute other law enforcement
techniques in the course of criminal investigations."' This lack of
clarity, which forces law enforcement to question the legal
standards permitting access to various types of location data can,
among other things, disrupt the progress of investigations and
make the prudent prosecutor worry about whether her evidence
will be admissible at trial. Indeed, after the Jones decision came
down, federal law enforcement agents were instructed to turn off
three thousand GPS devices while government lawyers searched
for an appropriate legal theory to permit them to be reactivated so,
at a minimum, they could be located and retrieved.'5 2 Moreover,
the FBI General Counsel has described the difficulty with
providing comprehensive, accurate guidance that would attempt to
instruct law enforcement agents on how to conduct activities in
anticipation of five potential future votes for some form of the
mosaic theory.'"
151 See Julia Angwin, FBI Turns Off Thousands of GPS Devices After
Supreme Court Ruling, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2012, 3:36 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/02/25/fbi-turns-off-thousands-of-gps-devices-
after-supreme-court-ruling/ ("For instance, . . . [the FBI General explained that
the] agency is now 'wrestling' with the legality of whether agents can lift up the
lid of a trash can without committing trespass.").
152 Id. The FBI General Counsel explained that "[a]fter the ruling [in Jones],
the FBI had a problem collecting the devices that it had turned off ... In some
cases,.. . the FBI sought court orders to obtain permission to turn the devices on
briefly-only in order to locate and retrieve them." Id.
'5 Id. ("The agency is also considering the implications of the concurring
justices-whose arguments were largely based on the idea that a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of their movements, even if
those movements are in public. 'From a law enforcement perspective, even
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While both Justices Scalia and Alito have directly given some
indication that Congress is the better branch of government to
address expanded government power afforded by location tracking
technologies,' 54 as of the writing of this Article, Congress has not
fared any better at creating clear rules that account appropriately
for this expanded power without unduly limiting law enforcement
investigations."' Congress has made some initial fitful progress, if
progress can be measured by hearings held "6 or bills drafted,
which set new standards for law enforcement compelled
disclosures of location data from third parties and the use of GPS
tracking devices placed on cars. 15 But Congress has its own
substantive challenges with respect to addressing the expansion of
government power enabled by new and evolving surveillance
technologies. If courts are generally limited by the very specificity
of their mission under the Constitution in applying existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine to the facts of a particular case, as Justice
Alito would prescribe,"' then Congress must confront the inverse
though it's not technically holding, we have to anticipate how it's going to go
down the road.' "). At the conference where these statements were made, the
FBI General Counsel held up thick draft memos to underscore his point that the
Jones Court had created a great deal of difficulty with respect to providing clear,
accurate guidance to the field. University of San Francisco Law Review
Symposium: Big Brother in the 21st Century? Reforming the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (Feb. 24, 2012). The author was in the audience
during the General Counsel's remarks.
154 See supra Part I; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito,
J., concurring).
1 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 28, at 157-62 (discussing various
challenges Congress faces in passing legislation to regulate law enforcement
access to location data).
156 See, e.g., ECPA Reform Hearing, supra note 119; Hearing on H.R. 2168,
the "Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, " Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. (2012).
15 See, e.g., Online Communications and Geolocational Protection Act, H.R.
983, 113th Cong. (2013); Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R.
2168, 112th Cong. (2011); Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 1212,
112th Cong. (2011);. These bills require a Rule 41 "probable cause" standard
for all law enforcement compelled disclosures of cell phone location data.
158 See supra discussion in Part II.A.
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challenge of the potentially grand scope of its own inquiry. That is,
ideally, Congress should examine the issues broadly (to include
understanding how the technology works so as to appreciate how it
impinges on privacy interests and expands or limits government
power), evaluate the positions of the various stakeholders (which,
in the case of electronic surveillance, often involves conflicting but
deeply held positions concerning privacy, law enforcement and
industry equities),'5 9 and craft more nuanced compromises (which
can and probably should include privacy protections beyond
simple tightening of law enforcement access standards)'6 0 than a
court would likely derive through a discrete application of the
Fourth Amendment.' 6'
An earlier article co-authored by this writer and Dr.
Christopher Soghoian directly examines the dynamics of the policy
debate currently taking place over law enforcement access to cell
phone location data and some of the substantive challenges facing
Congress with respect to finding reasonable standards for law
enforcement location data acquisition.162 It argues that the dueling
policy positions taken by two of the three major stakeholders
(privacy advocates and law enforcement) have resulted in a
stalemate that has stifled Congress's ability to pass legislation that
would raise some additional degree of privacy protection against
law enforcement access to location data.163 Privacy advocates are
seeking legislation that would require law enforcement to obtain a
warrant based on probable cause to access any amount (even a
single point of location data representing where someone was at
one moment in time) and duration of location data, including both
historical (where someone was) and prospective (real-time,
1 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 28, at 124-25 (generally describing the
conflicting positions law enforcement and privacy advocates have taken with
respect to standards permitting law enforcement access to location data).
160 Id. at 176-77 (arguing that access standards alone will not achieve the
appropriate balance between law enforcement, privacy and industry equities).
161 See Slobogin, supra note 58 (proposing a statutory implementation of the
mosaic theory).
162 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 28.Id. at 123-24.
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forward-looking tracking)." One measure of the effectiveness of
that advocacy is the introduction of several bills that adopt an "all
warrant" standard. ' Such "warrant only" bills, however, are
unlikely to become law because law enforcement makes
compelling arguments that a blanket warrant standard would
unduly impede legitimate law enforcement investigative activities,
especially at early stages of an investigation when police or federal
agents are unlikely to be able to demonstrate that there is probable
cause to believe that the location data itself is evidence of a
crime."
Just as Justice Breyer, during the Jones oral argument,
announced that he was searching for a "reason and [a] principle"
that would "reject" this kind of government surveillance "but
wouldn't also reject [government tracking] 24 hours a day for 28
days,"' Congress continues to search for the correct balance. But
even if law enforcement advocacy is ultimately successful in
preventing legislation that codifies a blanket warrant standard for
all types of location tracking, the Jones opinions may be a catalyst
for the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and state and local law
enforcement to begin earnestly engaging with Congress in an effort
to agree on some reasonable privacy protections. Indeed, Justice
Alito's answer for how to deal with the thorny line drawing
problem under a theory that does not define when the mosaic
materializes is simple: "[W]here uncertainty exists with respect to
whether a certain period GPS surveillance is long enough to
constitute a Fourth Amendment Search, the police may seek a
warrant."' 6 8 If this potential reality is unworkable (that is, if an all
warrant standard for any form location tracking will unduly limit
164 Id. at 123.
165 See supra note 157.
166 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 28, at 154-56 (explaining how a "strict
probable cause standard for the disclosure of location information could
interfere with legitimate law enforcement objectives").
16 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 25.
168 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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investigative activities),'69 or if the prospects of providing guidance
to the field agents in the wake of the Jones opinions, which suggest
there may be five votes for a mosaic-like Fourth Amendment
theory, is too challenging,'70 then law enforcement can avail itself
of the congressional balancing process.
III. TECHNOLOGY GIVES AND TECHNOLOGY TAKES AWAY
The Supreme Court in Jones and the Congress, each within the
scope of its respective authority, are searching for the appropriate
way to regulate government use of location tracking technologies.
Moreover, Justice Sotomayor, in her concurrence, also seeks to
curb overly broad government access to other types of data, the
collection of which has the effect of magnifying the Government's
power by sharpening the acuity of its tenacious gaze-a tendency
she suggests could unreasonably and harmfully inhibit citizen
participation in a democratic society. "' But the courts and
Congress are not the only possible influences upon the scope and
manner of government access to information. Indeed, there is a
third player on the field who can act as an indirect regulator of
government surveillance powers and who can, in doing so, change
the very facts and circumstances Congress and the courts must
accommodate in their own more direct efforts to intervene. This
third regulator is technology itself in the form of specific new(ish)
methods an individual or group of individuals can use to make it
more difficult, in some cases perhaps impossible, for law
enforcement to obtain the information it seeks.
Professor Lawrence Lessig has written about code as the
"salient regulator" of cyberspace, summarizing the concept in the
now common aphorism, "code is law."' 72 He explains:
169 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 17. Deputy Solicitor
General Dreeben made statements at the Jones oral argument indicating that the
"principle use" of GPS tracking surveillance "is when police have not yet
acquired probable cause but have a situation that does call for monitoring."
170 See discussion supra note 153.
171 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also supra Part II.
172 LESSIG, supra note 18, at 5.
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This regulator is code-the software and hardware that make
cyberspace as it is. This code, or architecture, sets the terms on which
life in cyberspace is experienced. It determines how easy it is to
protect privacy, or how easy it is to censor speech. It determines
whether access to information is general or whether information is
zoned. It affects who sees what, or what is monitored. 173
Professor Lessig's general maxim about cyberspace, "code as
regulator, code is law," is useful to explain a third set of forces,
including encryption and anonymization technologies (two
components of a broader set of privacy enhancing technologies).174
These technologies may prove to be additional, perhaps more
effective, mechanisms for maintaining reasonable limits upon the
rapid increase of government power that is a leading characteristic
of the digital age, in which the acuity of both the Government's
own gaze and that of the commercial third parties who often
cooperate with it has grown immeasurably sharper.'17  Technology
giveth, and technology taketh away. Indeed, this Part argues that
these technologies can "give" significantly by playing dual
privacy- and security-enhancing roles in providing, for example,
defenses against cybersecurity threats, while they simultaneously
"take away" in similar measure by limiting or preventing law
enforcement access to communications content.'7 1 One of these
technologies can also allow people to browse and communicate
over the Internet anonymously, thus facilitating the protection of
1n Lawrence Lessig, Code Is Law, HARV. MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2000, available at
http://harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html.
174 See ENTERPRISE PRIVACY GROUP, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: AN OVERVIEW OF
PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2008), available at
http://www.ico.org.uk/upload/documents/pdbreport html/pbd_petspaper.pdf
("There is no widely accepted definition for the term Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PETs) although most encapsulate similar principles; a PET is
something that: 1. reduces or eliminates the risk of contravening privacy
principles and legislation; 2. minimises the amount of data held about
individuals; 3. empowers individuals to retain control of information about
themselves at all times.").
'7 See generally Christopher Soghoian, supra note 48 (arguing and
documenting how "telecommunications carriers and service provides play an
essential role facilitating modem [law enforcement] surveillance").
176 See discussion infra Part III.A & B.
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the identities of dissidents as they seek to communicate over the
Internet invisible to the threatening gaze of repressive
governments. ' This same anonymity, however, might enable
criminals to shield their identities as they browse, communicate,
and otherwise conduct illicit activities using communications
networks."' The dynamic "give and take" fostered by the complex
dualistic properties of such technologies is creating a similar
dialogical pattern in the larger congressional public policy debate
over the relative wisdom of expanding the Government's
wiretapping capabilities in the face of growing and justified
concerns about the cybersecurity vulnerabilities such expanded
capabilities inevitably create when they are introduced into
communications networks."'
To be clear about the limits of the inquiry here, this Article
does not suggest that these specific privacy-enhancing
technologies will constrain government power (i.e., limit
government access to data or thwart government interception
capabilities) with respect to the specific location tracking tools at
issue in the Jones case. Rather, these technologies play a role in
limiting government power in the context of the larger discussion
about overly broad government access to data and its most
insidious potential political effects, as described in Justice
Sotomayor's concurrence."' On that basis, this Part will argue that,
insofar as these technologies may require the Government to work
harder to get information by spending more time and resources on
investigating cases, they will reintroduce an element of needed
fundamental friction into a law enforcement access regime in
which, for decades now, the Government's gaze has been
inexorably sharpened by previous technological advances.'"'
This Part takes the form of two case studies, both exploring the
impact that specific privacy enhancing technologies can have: Tor,
" See discussion infra Part III.A.
"' See id.
179 See discussion infra Part III.C.
180 See discussion supra Part II.C.
"''See supra accompanying text in notes 39, 48.
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an anonymization technology, and Silent Circle,18 an encryption
technology. This Part begins by explaining what each does,
including the particular "give and take" dynamic promoted by the
specific properties of each technology, and how each can thwart
certain aspects of law enforcement investigations. This Part
continues by placing these technologies and their complex dualistic
properties within the dialogue of the larger public policy debate
currently playing out in Congress. Finally, this Part discusses how
these technologies, though they may not carry the legal clarity or
authority of either a congressional or court ordered privacy
mandate, may nevertheless, in the absence of direct intervention by
a court or legislature, provide a kind of temporary "fix" that adjusts
the prevailing imbalance of power in the Government's favor until
judicial or legislative action can provide a more definitive answer.
A. Tor
Tor "is a network of virtual tunnels that allows people to
improve their privacy and security."' Originally developed by
the Naval Research Lab'84 and subsequently funded by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency ("DARPA") to facilitate
anonymous online activities by government personnel,"' Tor is an
"onion routing"l8 technology which hides a user's IP address,'
182 In the interest of full disclosure, the author was a paid consultant for Silent
Circle in 2012.
183 Tor: Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en
(last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
184 id
85 ANDY GREENBERG, THIS MACHINE KILLS SECRETS 139 (Dutton Inc. 2012).
186 Onion Routing "routes a user's Internet data between a series of random
volunteer 'node' computers. This process makes it virtually impossible to trace
the data request back to the original user." Geoffrey A. Fowler, Tor: An
Anonymous, And Controversial, Way to Web-Surf WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000 14241278873246772045781853823771442
80.html?mod=e2tw. It "is a flexible communications infrastructure that is
resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis." Id It is a communications
intelligence technique that can identify, among other things, the sender, the
receiver, and the time and length of communications messages. See GEORGE
DANEZIS, INTRODUCING TRAFFIC ANALYSIS: ATTACKS, DEFENSES AND PUBLIC
POLICY ISSUES (INVITED TALK) 3 (2005), available at
525SPRING 2013]
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
making it appear to originate from a Tor server rather than the
actual address from which the user is connecting to the Internet.
As security researcher Dr. Christopher Soghoian explains:
When someone browses the web using Tor or a VPN service [a weaker
type of anonymization technology than Tor] their Internet traffic
appears to originate at the Tor or VPN server, rather than from their
home connection. Thus, a US citizen located in Chicago who uses a
Tor exit server in France will, to Google or Facebook, appear to be a
user in France. Likewise, someone in Iran connecting to the web via a
Tor exit server located in San Francisco will appear to the New York
Times as a web surfer from San Francisco.18 8
Available to the public as a free service, Tor offers anonymity to
its users by shielding information about a user's online activities,
which can include "hiding" both the metadata (where a user is
coming from and where they are going to) as well as the contents
http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/gdane/talks/TAIntro-prez.pdf;
Executive Summary, ONION ROUTING, http://www.onion-
router.net/Summary.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013) ("Onion routing
accomplishes this goal by separating identification from routing. Connections
are always anonymous, although communication need not be. Communication
may be made anonymous by removing identifying information from the data
stream.").
187 See GREENBERG, supra note 185, at 136. "IP Addresses identify the
network that serves as the focal point from which a network-enabled device (a
computer, tablet or smartphone) accesses the Internet. When a portable device
moves from an Internet connection on one network (the network connection
from one's home, for example) to an Internet connection on another network (a
local coffee shop), the IP Address associated with the portable device will
change." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Objections of Real Parties in
Interest Jacob Appelbaum, Birgitta Jonsdottir and Rop Gonggrijp to March 11,
2011 Order Denying Motion to Vacate at 4, In re Application of the United
States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), No. 1:11 -dm-
00003-TCB-LO (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.wired.com/
imagesblogs/threatlevel/2011/03/Bellovin-Amicus-in-Twitter-WikiLeaks-
Case.pdf.
188 Christopher Soghoian, Does Using Certain Privacy Tools Expose You to
Warrantless NSA Surveillance? ACLU Files FOIA to Find Out, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 27, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security-technology-and-liberty/does-using-certain-privacy-tools-expose-you.
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of communications. 189 Such anonymity prevents anyone else
capable of intercepting network traffic (e.g., ISPs or government
agencies) from being able to determine, for example, who is
visiting a website or the identities of users communicating with
each other.19 If a target cannot be located on the network, it
becomes difficult to intercept a target's communications. Tor also
allows users to "publish websites and other services without
needing to reveal the location of the site."' 9 The Tor website
explains:
Using Tor protects you against a common form of Internet surveillance
known as "traffic analysis." Traffic analysis can be used to infer who
is talking to whom over a public network. Knowing the source and
destination of your Internet traffic allows others to track your behavior
and interests. This can impact your checkbook if, for example, an e-
commerce site uses price discrimination based on your country or
institution of origin. It can even threaten your job and physical safety
by revealing who and where you are. For example, if you're travelling
abroad and you connect to your employer's computers to check or send
mail, you can inadvertently reveal your national origin and professional
affiliation to anyone observing the network, even if the connection is
encrypted.192
Such anonymity facilitates a variety of interests and goals pursued
by various U.S. agencies. Indeed, the State Department funds Tor
in order to facilitate secure communications among political
189 See TOR: Overview, supra note 183 ("To create a private network
pathway with Tor, the user's software or client incrementally builds a circuit of
encrypted connections through relays on the network. The circuit is extended
one hop at a time, and each relay along the way knows only which relay gave it
data and which relay it is giving data to. No individual relay ever knows the
complete path that a data packet has taken. The client negotiates a separate set of
encryption keys for each hop along the circuit to ensure that each hop can't trace
these connections as they pass through.").
10 See Tor Project: Anonymnity Online, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/
index.html.en (last visited Apr. 27, 2013) (explaining that "Tor protects you by
bouncing your communications around a distributed network of relays run by
volunteers all around the world: It prevents somebody watching your Internet
connection from learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit
from learning your physical location").
9 Tor: Overview, supra note 183.
192 id
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dissidents (i.e., free from surveillance by oppressive governments),
and the military uses Tor for "open-source intelligence, gleaning
foreign policy or military strategy from other countries' websites
without tipping them off to a 'spook's' presence."" Moreover,
"Military personnel need to use electronic resources run and
monitored by insurgents. They do not want the webserver logs on
an insurgent website to record a military address, thereby revealing
the surveillance."1 94 Similarly, law enforcement agencies use Tor
for certain investigative activities (officials can visit questionable
websites without alerting those running the websites to law
enforcement's presence which, in most circumstances, would
expose any ongoing investigation of the website) and stings or
online undercover operations (regardless of how well developed
and executed an undercover officer's cover may be, if his
"communications include IP ranges from police addresses, the
cover is blown").'95
Use of Tor's free software has reportedly doubled in the past
year, with six hundred thousand people using it every day. 196
Andrew Lewman, Tor's executive director, explains that "[t]en
years ago, no one had this concept of privacy,... [b]ut with the
[General David] Petraeus scandal and cellphones recording your
location, now this doesn't seem so far-fetched anymore."' Indeed,
fourteen percent of Tor's traffic now connects from locations in the
United States and "people living in Internet-censoring countries are
now Tor's second-largest user base."'
1 GREENBERG, supra note 185, at 140.
194 Users of Tor, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en (last
visited Feb. 21, 2013).
195 id.
196 Fowler, supra note 186.
197 Id. For an analysis of how a privacy-enhancing technology like Tor may
have thwarted law enforcement's ability to identify Paula Broadwell, which
eventually led to the discovery of her relationship with General and former CIA
Director David Petraeus, see Christopher Soghoian, Surveillance and Security
Lessons From the Petraeus Scandal, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 13,
2012, 4:24 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-
security/surveillance-and-security-lessons-petraeus-scandal.
198 id.
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Criminals, however, can use Tor, as well. Andy Greenberg, a
technology reporter for Forbes Magazine and author of a recent
book about the history of the "cypherpunk" movement which aims
to free the world's information concludes that "[i]t's no secret Tor
is used by child pornographers and black hat hackers."" 9 John
Shehan, the Director of the National Center for Missing &
Exploited Children, describes Tor as " 'a challenge for law
enforcement,' " indicating, "[i]t is being used regularly to trade
sexually exploitative images of children-although there is little
Tor's creators can do about it."200 When criminals use Tor to mask
their IP addresses, which otherwise could often be "mapped to a
city or even a street location"20 ' by obtaining records from the
target's internet service provider ("ISP"), law enforcement's
efforts to identify who may have sent a threatening email or
downloaded a child pornography image can be thwarted. This is
because the IP address logged by the email provider or child
pornography serving website will appear to be the address of one
of the Tor servers, rather than an address provided to the user by
their ISP. 202 Tor servers, which are comprised of volunteers
around the world lending their computers to the Tor network,203 do
not keep logs and thus cannot provide any information to law
enforcement about the activities of the users of the network. Law
enforcement can, of course, use other, more traditional
investigative techniques or different technical tools, which may
include investigating opportunity and motive, finding witnesses,
conducting an undercover sting operation, or technical analysis of
content. But each case is different, and there is no guarantee that
use of any particular technique or combination of techniques will
19 GREENBERG, supra note 185, at 140.
200 Fowler, supra note 186.
201 Users of Tor, supra note 194.
202 When someone browses the web using Tor, their Internet traffic appears to
originate at the Tor server, rather than from their actual Internet connection, thus
masking the true IP address (identity) of the individual who downloaded the
child pornography image or sent the threatening email. See supra text
accompanying note 188.
203 The Tor network "depends on volunteers ... whose computers help reroute
and conceal Internet traffic." Fowler, supra note 186.
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ultimately identify the suspect behind the masked IP address.
Moreover, the use of such techniques merely to identify a target or
several targets can be far more time consuming and resource
intensive than merely sending a subpoena to an ISP.20 4
For Tor to work for the "good guys," however, the good guys
cannot be the only ones who use Tor.205 Indeed, the variety of
people who use Tor is an essential part of its security protocol.2 06
Tor hides an individual among a diverse group of other users on
the network. 207 "Anonymity loves company": 208 The more
"populous and diverse the user base," the more each user's
anonymity will be protected.209 If only law enforcement, military
or human rights workers use Tor, then their identities will not be
anonymous or secure because the mere connection to a Tor server
would reveal their affiliation. While Tor provides security that can
facilitate certain government objectives, it can, simultaneously,
challenge other law enforcement missions. Indeed, Tor is a
technology at the nexus of privacy and security, with a
204 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006) (permitting the disclosure of basic
subscriber, session, and billing information with the use of "an administrative
subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury
subpoena"). This basic subscriber, session, and billing information includes
"records of session times and durations as well as IP addresses assigned to the
user during Internet connection." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND
SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 138 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL], available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf.
205 See Roger Dingledine & Nick Mathewson, Anonymity Loves Company:
Usability and the Network Effect, Proceedings of the Fifth Workshop on the
Economics of Information Security, THE FREE HAVEN PROJECT 3 (2006)
available at http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/usability:weis2006.pdf
("Anonymity networks work by hiding users among users. . . . No organization
can build this infrastructure for its own sole use. If a single corporation or
government agency were to build a private network to protect its operations, any
connections entering or leaving that network would be obviously linkable to the
controlling organization. The members and operations of that agency would be
easier, not harder, to distinguish.").
206 See id.
207 Tor: Overview, supra note 183.
208 Dingledine & Mathewson, supra note 205, at 3.
209 id
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technological "nature" that is complex and dualistic-it gives and
it takes away, sometimes forcing difficult tradeoffs among valued
equities as it goes.
B. Silent Circle
Silent Circle is an "end-to-end"21 0 encryption service offering,
among other things, encrypted texts and phone calls. 211 The
service can be purchased by any individual and used on his or her
mobile device via the Silent Circle app.2 12 The encryption keys
used to protect communications are generated on the device and
then erased when they are no longer needed for functionality-so
they disappear when the communication is completed. 213  The
Silent Circle service does not generate the encryption keys and
does not hold the keys on their servers. 214 The company, therefore,
has no ability to decrypt user communications. 2 15 Because Silent
Circle does not possess the encryption keys, the company cannot
provide access to anyone else, good or bad. 2 16  As Silent Circle
explains on its website, "Our encryption keeps unauthorized
people from understanding your transmissions. It keeps criminals,
governments, business rivals, neighbors and identity thieves from
stealing your data and from destroying your personal or corporate
210 End-to-end encryption can be generally described as "a method to secure
data while in flight from one device to another . . . [and] loosely define[d] as a
method to protect data in flight over a network such that only each end of the
transaction has the ability to see the plaintext." BRANDEN WILLIAMS, WILL END
To END ENCRYPTION SAVE US ALL? 3 (2010) available at
https://www.brandenwilliams.com/brwpubs/WillEndtoEndEncryptionSaveUsAll
.pdf.
211 See Silent Network - We Designed It, We Custom-Built It, & We Own The
Network, SILENT CIRCLE, https://silentcircle.com/web/silent-network/ (last




215 What We Do & Don't Do, SILENT CIRCLE,
https://silentcircle.com/web/what-we-do-dont-do/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013)
("We do not have the ability to decrypt your communications across our
network and nor will anyone else - ever.").
216 id
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privacy. There are no back doors in our systems, nor will there
ever be." 217
A "back door" is the general term describing a mechanism or
access point in a communications device or network that enables
"the creator of software or hardware [to] access data without the
permission or knowledge of the user."21 8 Building in such back
door access, however, inevitably produces security vulnerabilities.
Indeed, as security researcher Dr. Susan Landau explains:
Building wiretapping [capabilities] into communications infrastructure
creates serious risk that the communications system will be subverted
either by trusted insiders or skilled outsiders, including foreign
governments, hackers, identity thieves and perpetrators of economic
219espionage.
Back doors create additional "attack surfaces,"220 that is, code must
be written to create the back door and the code must have
unfettered access to communications content. The additional code
creates the potential for more bugs (more code, more bugs) 221 that
could be exploited to allow improper access to the system.
Moreover, for a back door in an encrypted communications service
217 d
218 Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM.
Sd. & TECH. L. REv. 416, 460 (2012).
219 Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New
Technologies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 12th Cong. 2 (2011)
[hereinafter Going Dark Hearing] (statement of Dr. Susan Landau, Fellow,
Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University [hereinafter Landau
Statement]) at 2, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
Landau02172011 .pdf).
22o Jim Pravetz, What's An Attack Surface?, THE ZERO TOUCH BLOG (Feb. 23,
2013), http://www.armor5.com/blog/2013/what-is-attack-surface/. ("In the
world of computer security, the term attack surface refers to the depth of
methods a hacker can use to exploit your system.")
221 See Chad Perrin, The Danger of Complexity: More Code, More Bugs, IT
SECURITY BLOG (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/the-
danger-of-complexity-more-code-more-bugs/3076 ("If you want to produce
secure software, you should focus on following the advice . . . . All else being
equal, if you can find a way to eliminate lines of code without compromising the
proper functioning of the software, you will probably improve the security of the
software substantially.").
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to offer interception functionality, the service provider must have
momentary access to the unencrypted communications data. 2 22 As
a result, if and when security flaws in the system are discovered
and exploited, the worst-case scenario will be unauthorized access
to users' communications. This means that when compromised, an
encrypted communications system with a lawful interception back
door is far more likely to result in the catastrophic loss of
communications confidentiality than a system that never has access
to the unencrypted communications of its users.223
With respect to encrypted communications systems, there are a
wide range of actors who may seek to infiltrate systems and
discover backdoors, including academic security researchers and
"white hat" hackers who look for security vulnerabilities in
222 See Storing Passwords, or The Risk of a No-Salt Diet, TECH@FTC (Mar.
21, 2013), http://techatftc.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/storing-passwords-or-the-
risk-of-a-no-salt-diet/. When discussing best practices for storing and protect
passwords, security researcher Dr. Steven Bellovin begins with a fundamental
security principle: "It's a prime rule of security: something that doesn't exist
can't be stolen. Conversely, if something does exist, it can be stolen or leaked in
many, many ways." Id This principle is applicable to law enforcement-enabled
back doors as well: If they exist, they will be discovered and exploited.
223 See generally Vassilis Prevelakis and Diomidis Spinellis, The Athens Affair:
How Some Extremely Smart Hackers Pulled Off the Most Audacious Cell-
Network Break-In Ever, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 29, 2007, 18:33 GMT),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair (describing how
"hackers broke into a [Greek] telephone network and subverted its built-in
wiretapping features for their own purposes . . .. While the hack was complex,
the taps themselves were straightforward. When the [Greek] prime minister, for
example, initiated or received a call on his cellphone, the exchange would
establish the same kind of connection used in a lawful wiretap-a connection to
a shadow number allowing it to listen in on the conversation"); see generally
U.S. NAT'L SEC. Ass'N, PHONE FREAKS CAN INVADE YOUR PRIVACY (1976),
available at http://explodingthephone.com/docs/db904 (describing how
interfaces used by phone company employees to determine if a line was busy
were subverted by outsiders to listen to phone conversations).
The author is indebted to Dr. Christopher Soghoian for several discussions in
which he explained the various reasons why introducing back doors into
encrypted systems inevitably renders those systems less secure (interview with
Dr. Christopher Soghoian on Mar. 14, 2013 and Apr. 6, 2013, and to Dr. Steven
Bellovin for providing additional source material illustrating that conclusion.
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systems and earn money by disclosing the information to the
authors of the products or the public.22 4 Other actors include "large
organized crime operations that possess ample resources to attract
costly computer security talent, or foreign governments."2 25 After
gaining access to or breaking into a system, an insider or intruder
can subvert built-in wiretapping capabilities for his own
purposes.226 There is no way to create a back door that will work
only for legitimate surveillance when an intruder breaches a
system or an insider gains unauthorized access to and use of that
back door.227
Taking steps to protect communications and data is critical at a
time when "cyberexploitations have become constant occurrences,"
and many U.S. companies and government sites have been
targeted.228 According to Dr. Landau:
The modus operandi is always the same. Some software
vulnerability-unpatched software, a user opening a targeted mail that
contains malware (or that directs the user to a site with malware-
allows the intruder in. The intruder spend[s] time carefully studying
the site and finding the files of interest. At some point, the intruder
efficiently ships out copies. This is carefully done. By the time the
corporate or government site becomes aware that there has been an
intrusion, it is often too late. The data has been shipped to China.
Organizations that have been exploited in this way cut across large
swaths of American industry and government, including such leading
members as Google, Lockheed Martin, NASA, Northrup Grumman,
Oak Ridge [and] National Laboratory. 229
Silent Circle's products offer users-whether they are individuals,
corporations or government clients-an important defense against
224 Swire & Ahmad, supra note 218, at 460.
225 id.
226 See Prevelakis & Spinellis, supra note 223.
227 See id.; see also Swire & Ahmad, supra note 218, at 433 ("The main
problem with backdoors, however, is that it is extremely difficult to install a
backdoor that can be used by the 'good guys,' such as authorized law
enforcement wire tappers, but not by the 'bad guys.' ") (citing SUSAN LANDAU,
SURVEILLANCE OR SECURITY? THE RISKS POSED BY NEW WIRETAPPING
TECHNOLOGIES 175-202 (MIT Press 2011)).
228 Landau Statement, supra note 219, at 2.
229 Id. at 4.
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cyberexploitations because encryption keys are held by the users
on their mobile devices, then erased when no longer needed, thus
making it impossible for Silent Circle to give keys, willingly or
unwillingly, to anyone else.230 Moreover, the Silent Circle system
has no back doors. Accordingly, any compromise of the Silent
Circle servers would only permit the interception of encrypted
communications that, without the encryption keys stored only on
users' devices, would be an indecipherable cloud of ones and
zeros. 2 31
As descriptors like "end-to-end" encryption and claims to have
"no back doors in our systems" point to a high security threshold,
they also suggest to users that even lawfully authorized
surveillance by "good" governments will be challenging, if not
impossible. Indeed, just as adversaries will encounter an
indecipherable cloud of computer code, lawfully authorized
intercepts would have no clearer view.232 Silent Circle and similar
products will, therefore, force governments to find other ways to
acquire target communications at a point in time when they are not
encrypted. Such options, which may not be possible in all cases,
are time and resource intensive, do not scale, and cannot be used to
conduct nationwide surveillance.2 33
At this point in the discussion, however, it is worth noting the
dualistic "give and take" properties of end-to-end, user-held key
encryption products like Silent Circle for voice and text
communications. As discussed, they are an important defense in
the age of cyberexplotations. However, they may also thwart the
Government's ability to intercept communications in a timely
fashion, causing the Government to lose valuable evidence or
preventing the government from acquiring a target's
communications completely. 234 Indeed, Silent Circle is a
230 See SILENT CIRCLE, supra note 215.
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 See injia Part III.C.
234 Many of the observations about law enforcement investigations in this
Article are drawn from the author's experience as a former federal prosecutor
and a former counsel to the House Judiciary Committee.
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technology at the cusp of a public policy debate where stronger
cybersecurity practices (which in turn bolster U.S. national
security) may force tradeoffs with surveillance capabilities that
enable traditional law enforcement efforts.235
C. The Larger Public Policy Debate
In the fall of 2010, at least one news outlet reported that the
FBI was preparing to seek an expansion 23 6 of a 1994 law called the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
("CALEA").237 CALEA was enacted "to ensure law enforcement
surveillance capabilities remained intact during the move from a
copper-wire phone systems to digital networks." 238 With this
technological shift, CALEA required "telephone companies,
telecommunication service providers, and manufacturers of
telecommunication equipment ... to update their equipment,
facilities, and services to ensure built-in surveillance capabilities"
that would allow law enforcement agencies to monitor and access
communications in real-time.239 CALEA even required telephone
companies to provide and allow the FBI to review new
technologies prior to their implementation. 240 The exponential
growth of the Internet was just beginning when CALEA was
235 See infra Part III.C. In addition, for government personnel who may use
Silent Circle to facilitate secure communications in operational situations where
it is also important that they maintain a non-government cover, the diversity of
the Silent Circle user base facilitates the cover. If only government personnel
used Silent Circle (and had the Silent Circle app on their mobile device), then
their government identities could not remain secret. Like Tor then, for Silent
Circle to work for certain types of government personnel and missions, it must
be available to the general public. See supra Part III.A.
236 See Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/
27wiretap.html?_r-0 ("Federal law enforcement and national security officials
are preparing to seek sweeping new regulations for the Internet, arguing that
their ability to wiretap criminal and terrorism suspects is 'going dark' as people
increasingly communicate online instead of by telephone.").
23747 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006).
238 Swire & Ahmad, supra note 218, at 421.
239 id
240 Id. at 422.
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enacted and, as Professor Peter Swire and Kenesa Ahmad assert,
"The legislative compromise at the core of CALEA provided that
new wiretap ready requirements only applied to voice networks
and did not apply to internet protocol communications."2 4'
The proliferation of new Internet hardware and software
technologies continued apace as Internet usage grew exponentially,
exceeding four hundred million people in the year 2000, so it is not
hard to imagine how a requirement that the FBI review each new
CALEA-compliant technology before its deployment might have
hampered, perhaps even crippled, such innovation. 242 The resulting
effects of non-CALEA covered communication technologies on
wiretapping capabilities, however, have not been friendly to law
enforcement. In a 2011 House Judiciary Committee hearing
entitled "Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face
of New Technologies," former FBI General Counsel Valarie
Caproni testified as follows:
In the ever-changing world of modem communications technologies ...
the FBI and other government agencies are facing a potentially
widening gap between our legal authority to intercept electronic
communications pursuant to court order and our practical ability to
actually intercept those communications. . . . We call this capabilities
gap the "Going Dark" problem. As the gap between authority and
capability widens, the government is increasingly unable to collect
valuable evidence in cases ranging from child exploitation and
pornography to organized crime and drug trafficking to terrorism and
espionage-evidence that a court has authorized the government to
collect. This gap poses a growing threat to public safety.... [D]ue to
the revolutionary expansion of communications technology in recent
years, the government finds that it is rapidly losing ground in its ability
to execute court orders with respect to Internet-based communications
that are not covered by CALEA.2 43
241 Id. at 422 (emphasis added) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(A) (2006))
(excluding "information services").
242 See id; see also LANDAU, supra note 227, at 189 ("Applying CALEA-
compliance requirements to any application with communications would have
extremely negative impacts on innovation and the U.S. economy.").
243 Going Dark Hearing, supra note 219 (statement of Valerie Caproni,
General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Caproni
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It is important to recognize that the FBI General Counsel has
described a problem with wiretapping capabilities, not a lack of the
legal authority to conduct surveillance. Moreover, her use of the
phrase "gap between authority and capability" can be interpreted to
refer not only to new Internet-based technologies not covered
under CALEA's wiretapping requirements, but also to other
technological barriers, like encryption, which create a gap between
the authority to intercept communications and the capability to
execute the surveillance. 2" Indeed, there was a time in history
when law enforcement actively opposed encryption technologies
that did not contain government-mandated back doors. In 1997,
Former FBI Director Louis Freeh testified to the House Committee
on International Relations that law enforcement:
[I]s [seeking] a balanced encryption policy, one that will allow the
technology to progress, but at the same time put in there a safety valve
and an access point controlled by the courts which myself and people in
the Intelligence Community can get to and understand evidence where
it is important for us to do so.... The inability to deal with robust
encryption, the lack [of] any access in real-time, to this information
in . .. many cases, will, in my view . . . affect public safety and maybe
even tragically cost lives.245
In that same year, the House Intelligence Committee passed a bill
out of Committee, "drafted in large part by the FBI," imposing
"criminal penalties ... [for] manufacturing or distribut[ing]
domestic encryption products that did not contain a government-
mandated back door." 246  In an Article examining the debate on
Statement], at 1, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
Caproni02172011 .pdf).
244 Swire & Ahmad, supra note 218, at 464 n.141; see also Max Eddy, The
Real Reason the Feds Can't Read Your iMessages, SECURITY WATCH (Apr. 4,
2013, 12:29 pm), http://securitywatch.pcmag.com/none/310015-the-real-reason-
the-feds-can-t-read-your-imessages (describing how encryption and the lack of
CALEA-mandated wiretapping capabilities thwart law enforcement's ability to
intercept real-time messages sent over Apple's iMessage system).
245 Member Briefing Regarding Encryption: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
On International Relations, 105th Cong. 6-8 (1997) (statement of Louis J. Freeh,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at
http://cryptome.org/jya/hir-hear.htm.
246 Swire & Ahmad, supra note 218, at 438.
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encryption policies in the face of increasing globalization,
Professor Swire and Kenesa Ahmad document the factual, policy
and legal arguments informing the three stages of the so-called
"crypto wars" of the 1990s, with the third and final stage
representing the Clinton Administration's position shift in 1999
that lifted most export controls on encryption. 247 This action
signaled that the Government had "explicitly endorsed the view
that strong encryption is needed for the Internet." 248 Their
scholarship illustrates, however, that the legality of the type of
encryption service offered by Silent Circle-one in which there are
no government back doors-has not always been a foregone
conclusion.2 49 Professor Swire, who was chair of the White House
Working Group on Encryption preparing for the 1999
announcement, explains that, over time, it became clear that "no
technical fix . . . was available to provide access only to the 'good
guys' but not the 'bad guys.' "250
With the looming possibility of an Obama Administration
proposal to expand CALEA,25 I security researchers Dr. Steven
Bellovin, Dr. Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark and Dr. Susan Landau
recently proposed options to address the growing gap between law
247 See id. at 439.
248 Id. at 440.
249 See id. at 437-41.
250 Id. at 440-41. Hacking software is no longer a secretive government tool.
See, e.g., Servers in Canada Linked to FinFisher Spyware Program, CBC NEWS,
(Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/03/13/pol-cp-
cybersecurity-germany-spyware-canada.html ("Researchers said Wednesday
that they have identified 25 countries that host servers linked to FinFisher, a
Trojan horse program which can dodge anti-virus protections to steal data, log
keystrokes, eavesdrop on Skype calls, and turn microphones and webcams into
live surveillance devices.").
251 See Declan McCullagh, FBI: We Need Wiretap-Ready Web Sites-Now,
CNET (May 4, 2012, 9:24 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57428067-
83/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites-now/ (claiming that "[t]he FBI is
asking Internet companies not to oppose a controversial proposal that would
require firms, including Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, and Google, to build in
backdoors for government surveillance").
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enforcement surveillance authorities and capabilities. 252 Their
primary and provocative solution is to enable and expand FBI
hacking capabilities rather than give them back doors.253 In other
words, these researchers assert that "a better way to protect privacy
and security on the internet may be for the FBI to get better at
breaking into computers."254 Rather than requiring the insertion of
back doors-whether by way of a CALEA-type mandate where
wiretapping capabilities are built into the architecture of
communications networks, devices and applications, or through
hidden "lawful intercept" access features 255 enforcement
should "exploi[t] naturally occurring weaknesses in subjects'
devices, enabling law enforcement to install surreptitious
interception software at a target endpoint as required."256 This
option represents a fundamental paradigm shift away from
mandated communications network-based interception (i.e.,
CALEA mandated wiretapping capabilities built into carrier
networks), to a focus on exploiting specific "software
vulnerabilities [that] exist whether or not law enforcement uses
them against its targets."257 Moreover, while maintaining some law
enforcement wiretapping capabilities, this option avoids the
security vulnerabilities, risks and costs associated with nationally
mandated wiretap interfaces.258
With respect to encrypted communications, this kind of
successful device exploitation would allow law enforcement to
acquire content communications before they are encrypted or after
they are decrypted-even when using an encryption service like
252 See Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark & Susan Landau, Going
Bright: Wiretapping without Weakening Communications Infrastructure, 14
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 62, 62 (2013).253 See Matt Blaze & Susan Landau, The FBI Needs Hackers, Not Backdoors,
WIRED (Jan. 14, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/01/
wiretap-backdoors/.254 Id. (emphasis added).
255 See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark & Landau, supra note 252, at 63.
256 Id. at 62-63.
257 Id. at 7 1.
258 Id. at 63.
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Silent Circle. 259 To support the viability of this "hacker" option,
these security researchers explain how law enforcement might go
about developing tools that exploit target endpoint vulnerabilities
and, in turn, maintain such exploitation capabilities. 260 It is
important to recognize, however, that these device-centered
exploitation capabilities will not scale anywhere near as easily or
in as expansive a manner as CALEA's nationally mandated
wiretap interfaces do. 261' Law enforcement's overall wiretapping
259 See SILENT CIRCLE, supra note 215. Ultimately, the Silent Circle service
"can't protect you against malware, spyware, or bugs in the OS [(operating
system)] or [] software." Id. In other words, if malware or spyware has been
installed by law enforcement or other entities on a target mobile device, law
enforcement may be able to acquire the communications in an unencrypted
format, notwithstanding the individual's use of Silent Circle or other encryption
services. Id.
260 See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark & Landau, supra note 252, at 66-68. These
researchers also briefly discuss (but do not fully address in their current Article)
that this hacker option raises a number of its own policy considerations
including the complex questions involved in making law enforcement an active
participate in the "vulnerabilities market." Id. at 69. For example, "Law
enforcement demand [for software vulnerabilities] might help skew incentives
against disclosing patches to the software vendors themselves, and some have
argued that the process increases the amount of software left unpatched." Id.
(internal citations omitted). It is also beyond the scope of this Article to discuss
and evaluate the policy implications of turning the FBI into hackers for purposes
of facilitating law enforcement wiretapping capabilities.
261 This is because, rather than relying on a CALEA-type centralized,
nationally mandated system for wiretapping capabilities, law enforcement's
ability to intercept target communications will rely on whether or not
vulnerabilities have been discovered on the specific mobile device used by the
target. See Bellovin, Blaze, Clark & Landau supra note 252, at 62 ("Continuing
technical access to authorized wiretaps can be achieved-without expanding
CALEA-by exploiting naturally occurring weaknesses in subjects' devices,
enabling law enforcement to install surreptitious interception software at a target
endpoint as required."). Moreover, each time law enforcement agencies exploit
the vulnerability, they risk the discovery of the flaw by security researchers.
After the vulnerability is discovered and reported to the software vendor, it will
be patched and can no longer facilitate law enforcement exploitation against
targets running the latest software, forcing law enforcement to find another
wiretapping method. See id. at 63 ("Many such weaknesses are 0-day
vulnerabilities, ones that might be completely unknown to others and for which
no vendor fix exists. (Conceptually, the bug is discovered on day zero and
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efforts will, therefore, become more time and labor intensive and
perhaps relatively less effective in acquiring evidence in
investigations. Perhaps recognizing this reality, while also
understanding the security benefits inherent in strong encryption
technologies, FBI General Counsel Caproni acknowledged in her
congressional testimony that:
Addressing the Going Dark problem does not require fundamental
changes in encryption technology. We understand that there are
situations in which encryption will require law enforcement to develop
individualized solutions. 26 2
Such "individualized solutions," whether attempted through broad
implementation of an FBI-as-"hacker" policy model or through
more traditional investigative techniques, like the use of
undercover agents and informants, may not be possible in every
case. Indeed, Bellovin, Blaze, Clark and Landau acknowledge that
"some targets will use communications systems for which
penetration is very difficult or expensive under our proposed
scheme." 263 Moreover, Caproni warned Congress about a
surveillance environment where individualized solutions must be
the rule rather than the exception:
There will always be criminals, terrorists, and spies who use very
sophisticated means of communications that are going to create very
specific problems for law enforcement. We understand that there are
times when you need to design an individual solution for an individual
target . .. . We are looking for a better solution for most of our targets,
and the reality is, I think, sometimes we want to think that criminals are
a lot smarter than they really are. Criminals tend to be some-what lazy,
and a lot of times, they will resort to what is easy. And, so long as we
have a solution that will get us the bulk of our targets, the bulk of
criminals, the bulk of terrorists, the bulk of spies, we will be ahead of
the game. We can't have individual-have to design individualized
solutions as though they were a very sophisticated target who was self-
encrypting and putting a very difficult encryption algorithm on for
reported and patched sometime later.)").
262 Caproni Statement, supra note 243, at 3 (emphasis added).
263 Bellovin, Blaze, Clark & Landau, supra note 252, at 67.
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every target we confront because not every target is using such
sophisticated communications. 264
Ms. Caproni's testimony suggests that, while law enforcement
resources may be able to accommodate the use of encryption by
the relatively limited number of truly "sophisticated criminals," a
more pervasive adoption of encryption by "mainstream" criminals
will overtax law enforcement resources. Indeed, if growing
numbers of garden variety criminals begin using encryption
products with no government-enabled back doors, then law
enforcement will be forced to make investigative choices,
prioritizing the most serious of investigations and de-emphasizing
others, if not dropping them altogether.
A surveillance environment defined by a more pervasive
availability and adoption of encryption products like Silent Circle
that may harm law enforcement investigative equities will force
Congress to confront tradeoffs between what might be
characterized as the more the traditional public safety mission of
law enforcement and necessary efforts to enhance cybersecurity, a
fundamental element of our greater national security. Indeed, Dr.
Landau has instructed Congress:
Beginning in this decade, the world shifted in two fundamental ways
that substantively changed the nature of this type of industrial
espionage; it was made cheaper, and there was a very large customer
for the information. The growth of the Internet and computing
technology has greatly simplified the ability of spies, especially those at
a distance, to get "inside" a company. The other change is China. Well
aware of the information infrastructure asymmetry between China and
the U.S., China is seeking to use the asymmetry to its advantage. Other
nations also exploit our heavy dependence on cyber infrastructure but
China seems particularly active in doing so. 265
The accuracy of Dr. Landau's warnings to the House Judiciary
Committee about China's propensity to engage in industrial
espionage efforts against the U.S. is becoming increasingly more
264 Going Dark Hearing, supra note 219, at 52 (oral testimony of Valerie
Caproni, General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/l12th/ 112-59_64581.PDF.
265 Landau Statement, supra note 219, at 5.
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public and pervasive. Consider the recent Mandiant Report266
documenting various exploits of some of the most sophisticated
Chinese government hacking groups. "Comment Crew," for
example, "has drained terabytes of data from companies like Coca-
Cola [but], increasingly its focus is on companies involved in the
critical infrastructure of the United States-its electrical power
grid, gas lines and waterworks."26 7 Moreover, "[O]ne target was a
company with remote access to more than 60 percent of oil and gas
pipelines in North America. The unit was also among those that
attacked the computer security firm RSA, whose computer codes
protect confidential corporate and government databases."268
In October 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence issued a bi-partisan report entitled, "Investigative
Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese
Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE," which
asserted that "China has the means, opportunity, and motive to use
telecommunications companies for malicious purposes," and that
"Chinese actors are . . . the world's most active and persistent
perpetrators of economic espionage." 269 In analyzing the
significant supply chain threats products produced by these
companies pose, "the Committee took seriously recent allegations
of backdoors ... [and] other unexpected elements in either
company's products."270
266 Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units, MANDIANT,
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/MandiantAPT1 Report.pdf (last visited Apr.
14, 2013).
267 David E Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth, Chinese Army Unit Is




269 H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112th Cong.,
INVESTIGATIVE REP. ON THE U.S. NAT'L SEC. ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE
TELECOMMS. Co. HUAWEI AND ZTE 2 (2012) (Chairman Mike Rogers and
Ranking Member C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger), available at
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Huaw
ei-ZTE%201nvestigative%2OReport%20%28FINAL%29.pdf.270 Id at 11.
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In March 2013, James R. Clapper, the Director of National
Intelligence, presented a written statement to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence containing, among other things, a
descriptive cyber threat assessment."' Director Clapper discusses
the erosion of our economic and national security:
Foreign intelligence and security services have penetrated numerous
computer networks of US Government, business, academic, and private
sector entities. Most detected activity has targeted unclassified
networks connected to the Internet, but foreign cyber actors are also
targeting classified networks. Importantly, much of the nation's critical
proprietary data are on sensitive but unclassified networks; the same is
true for most of our closest allies.2 72
Director Clapper also explains how cybercriminals, aided by
computer intrusion kits, are damaging US economic and national
security interests:
Cyber criminals also threaten US economic interests. They are selling
tools, via a growing black market, that might enable access to critical
infrastructure systems or get into the hands of state and nonstate actors.
In addition, a handful of commercial companies sell computer intrusion
kits on the open market. These hardware and software packages can
give governments and cybercriminals the capability to steal,
manipulate, or delete information on targeted systems. Even more
companies develop and sell professional-quality technologies to
support cyber operations-often branding these tools as lawful-
intercept or defensive security research products. Foreign governments
already use some of these tools to target US systems.273
With the growing awareness of such multi-faceted cyber threats,
recommendations for the general use of encryption for
communications and cloud data storage are coming from a range of
sources. In March 2010, Federal Trade Commissioner Pamela
Jones Harbour called on cloud computing providers to enable
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure ("HTTPS") encryption274 by
271 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community:
Statement for the Record for the S. Select Comm. On Intelligence, 113 th Cong.
(2013) (statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence),
available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf.
272 Id. at 6.
273 Id. at 7.
274 Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and
Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 ERA, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L.
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default. 275 Following the release of a plugin for the Firefox
browser called Firesheep that made it easy for a an average person
to "hijack" non-HTTPS browsing sessions, Senator Chuck
Schumer called on several major cloud computing companies to
enable HTTPS by default. 276 Richard Falkenrath and Paul
Rosenzweig, two former high ranking Homeland Security officials
in the Bush Administration, explain that encrypting data stored in
the cloud, where the customer holds the encryption keys allows the
customer to "maintain exclusive control of their data," thereby
avoiding certain security concerns inherent in cloud storage. 277
Indeed, if the data are encrypted locally before being transferred to
the cloud, "then it just doesn't matter who works at the server farm
or where the data is located (data can be stored in a number of
locations both inside and outside the United States), since no one
can see the data except the customer."2 7 8
The preceding discussion in this Part focused on the public
policy debate surrounding wiretapping capabilities for purposes of
obtaining real-time content communications, a debate that
anticipates DOJ and the FBI seeking Congressional action. While
this discussion has primarily focused on how encryption
359, 375 (2010) ("Bank of America, American Express and Amazon all use the
industry standard Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) encryption
protocol to ensure that all customer information is securely transmitted over the
network. This technology enables a user to safely conduct business online,
without the risk of a hacker capturing her private data as it crosses the network.
This is because to third parties, her encrypted communications appear as
undecipherable gibberish.").
275 Pamela Jones Harbour, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks
Before Third Federal Trade Commission Exploring Privacy Roundtable in
Washington, D.C. at 6-7 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/
harbour/100317privacyroundtable.pdf.
276 Soghoian, supra note 48, at 50-51 (citing Lance Whitney, Senator Wants
More Secure Web Sites for Wi-Fi Use, CNET (Feb. 29 2011, 9:10 AM),
available at news.cnet.com/8301-1009 3-20037253-83.html.
277 Richard Falkenrath & Paul Rosenzweig, Op-Ed: Encryption, Not
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technologies like Silent Circle may exacerbate the FBI's "Going
Dark" problem, Tor (and other anonymous browsing technologies)
plays its own role in this surveillance debate, as well. From a
technical standpoint, Tor frustrates wiretapping capabilities by
masking a user's IP address, thereby making it difficult for law
enforcement to locate a target.279 While the FBI General Counsel's
2011 "Going Dark" congressional testimony did not call out Tor,
neither federal nor state and local law enforcement has been silent
about potentially losing the ability to identify a suspect and her
location when she uses communication systems to commit
crimes. Indeed, in 2011 when the House Judiciary Committee was
considering legislation that would have required certain types of
service providers 28 0 to maintain records reflecting users' online
activities for a specific amount of time28' so that they would be
available to law enforcement if and when needed for criminal
investigations,2 82 state and federal law enforcement organizations
279 See supra Part III.A. Dr. Susan Landau notes, however, that Tor and other
anonymized communications systems "have high overhead and are not expected
to be used by the vast majority of users." LANDAU, supra note 227, at 199.
280 Tor is not a service provider and Tor network servers retain no logs that
could be provided to law enforcement. See supra Part III.A.
281 See Protecting Children From Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, H.R.
1981, 112th Cong. § 4(h)(1) (2011) (requiring a commercial provider of an
electronic communication service to retain for at least one year a log of the
temporarily assigned network addresses assigned to subscribers or customers
that enables the identification of corresponding customer or subscriber
information); see also Protecting Children From Internet Pornogrpahers Act of
2011, S. 1308, 112th Cong. 2011 § 4(h) (2011) (requiring a provider of an
electronic communication service or remote computing service to retain for at
least eighteen months a log of the temporarily assigned network addresses the
service assigns to each subscriber account unless that address is transmitted by
radio communication).
282 Data Retention as a Toolfor Investigating Internet Child Pornography and
Other Internet Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Data Retention Hearing],
(opening statement of Chairman James Sensenbrenner), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear 01252011 .html ("Today's hearing
examines the role of data retention as a law enforcement tool to investigate the
distribution of child pornography on the Internet and other online crimes. Many
Internet Service Providers, ISPs currently retain data that can be used to identify
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expressed their general support for mandated data retention
periods.283 A thorough discussion of the privacy and security
implications of mandated data retention periods and the challenges
of trying to regulate, with legislation, an open source privacy
enhancing technology like Tor 28 4 is beyond the scope of this
the operator or user of an illegal Web site. But not all ISPs retain this important
data, and the length of time such data is retained often varies from one provider
to the next. The issue of data retention is not new. In 1999, then Deputy
Attorney General Eric Holder said that certain data must be retained by ISPs for
reasonable periods of time so that it can be accessible to law enforcement.").
283 See id. at 11 (statement of Jason Weinstein, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., of the United States, Criminal Division) ("There is no doubt among public
safety officials that the gaps between providers' retention policies and law
enforcement agencies' needs can be extremely harmful to the agencies'
investigations. In 2006, forty-nine Attorneys General wrote to Congress to
express 'grave concern' about 'the problem of insufficient data retention policies
by Internet Service Providers.' They wrote that child exploitation investigations
'often tragically dead-end at the door of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that
have deleted information critical to determining a suspect's name and physical
location.' The International Association of Chiefs of Police adopted a formal
resolution stating that 'the failure of the Internet access provider industry to
retain subscriber information and source or destination information for any
uniform, predictable, reasonable period has resulted in the absence of data,
which has become a significant hindrance and even an obstacle in certain
investigations.' In 2008 testimony before this Committee, FBI Director Robert
Mueller reported that 'from the perspective of an investigator, having that
backlog of records would be tremendously important,' and that where
information is retained for only short periods of time, 'you may lose the
information you need to be able to bring the person to justice.' Former Attorney
General Gonzales similarly testified about 'investigations where the evidence is
no longer available because there's no requirement to retain the data.' "); see
also id. at 21 (statement of Chief John M. Douglass, Chair, Mid-Sized Cities
Section International Association of Chiefs of Police) ("[T]here are cases where
we are not able to work quickly enough-mostly because a 'lead' is discovered
after the logs have expired or we are unaware of the specific service provider's
protocols concerning data retention time periods.").
284 Open-source generally refers to "a program in which the source code is
available to the general public for use and/or modification from its original
design free of charge." Open Source, WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/O/open source.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2013). A foreign government's
attempt to mandate a government back door in open source anonymization
technology similar to Tor resulted in the discovery of the offending code, which
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Article. But that is not to say that the issue of data retention has
been erased from either the law enforcement or the congressional
agenda.
As Congress considers options, whatever they may be, to
address the "Going Dark" problem, a reckoning will occur-one in
which Congress will be forced to accommodate the complex
dualistic properties of technologies that, on one hand, bolster our
national security against certain kinds of threats (i.e.,
cyberexploitations) while, on the other, they limit or thwart law
enforcement's ability to fulfill its traditional public safety function
by investigating crimes, notwithstanding the fact that law
enforcement may have the legal authority to collect information
using a particular technique. Privacy enhancing technologies like
those described in this Article have the potential to frustrate the
legitimate investigation of serious crimes like child pornography
by law enforcement agencies, but also to protect individuals,
businesses and government agencies from cyber attacks and
espionage perpetrated by foreign governments. Although most
policy makers would probably prefer not to have to choose
between law enforcement and national security equities, the
potential widespread availability and use of such technologies may
make that choice an impossible one to avoid. Before Congress can
regulate effectively, it will have to reckon with, and account for,
"code" as both regulator and law.
D. Jonesing For A Privacy Mandate, Getting a Technology Fix
If we assess the Court's decision in Jones solely as an attempt
to create a clear rule or principle that sets appropriate limits on the
Government's power to track the movements of its citizens with
various types of location technologies, yet enables law
enforcement to use such tracking tools effectively in its
investigations, the decision must be seen as a noble failure. The
could be re-written by security researchers and re-released for use by the public
without the back door. See Soghoian, supra note 274, at 409-11 (describing the
German government's attempt to mandate a back door in Java Anonymous
Proxy, an open source project aimed at providing users with the ability to
browse the Internet anonymously).
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majority's holding is too narrow to apply to any tracking
technologies that do not require the physical attachment of a GPS
device on personal property.285 To date, Congress has fared no
better in its attempts to address these matters legislatively.286 The
concurring opinions in Jones endorse some form of a "mosaic
theory" as a way to constrain the increase in government power
enabled by twenty-first century location tracking technologies that
do not depend upon physical trespass.287 But the mosaic theory has
the potential to wreak havoc upon the process by which courts
determine whether a search has occurred and, if it has, whether it
was reasonable. 288 The theory is thus unworkable for
implementing Fourth Amendment protections. Justice
Sotomayor's concurrence holds out the yet unfulfilled additional
promise of Fourth Amendment protections that will not treat
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy-that is, a promise to
reexamine the appropriateness of the third party doctrine in the
digital age.289 At best, then, the Jones concurrences, even if they
cannot provide clear Fourth Amendment doctrine, serve to
reinforce the general intuitive recognition, shared by their authors,
that a new privacy mandate is needed. But the specific solutions
offered in Jones-application of the mosaic theory and
reconsideration of the third party doctrine-leave us all still
Jonesing for an adequate answer.
There is, however, a third and different form of authority that
serves to constrain government power in the digital age. That
authority is technology itself, discussed here in the form of two
specific types of encryption and anonymization technologies that
make it more difficult, in some cases perhaps impossible, for law
enforcement to obtain the information it seeks. 290 Indeed, by
forcing law enforcement to use non-scalable "individualized
solutions" to obtain content communications, which may include
285 See supra Part II.A.
286 See supra Part II.D.
287 See supra Part II.B.
288 See supra Part II.B.
289 See supra Part II.C.
290 See supra Part III.
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acquiring a target's communications through his individual device
rather than from CALEA-compliant communications carriers (like
phone companies), or simply using more traditional techniques like
undercover agents and sources to gather evidence in a case,
encryption technologies like Silent Circle introduce a measure of
friction back into the surveillance ecosystem. 291 Similarly,
anonymization technologies like Tor, which mask a user's IP
address, may require law enforcement to work much harder to
determine the identity and location of an individual or individuals
using communications systems to commit crimes-in some cases,
law enforcement efforts may prove impossible.292
These specific privacy-enhancing technologies have dualistic
"give and take" properties: on the one hand providing increasingly
important security in an environment where nation state espionage
and IP theft is a top national security threat and, on the other,
potentially thwarting law enforcement investigations.293 During
the coming year, if Congress, as has been forecast,29 4 examines
new DOJ and FBI proposals for expanding the CALEA, whatever
they may be, the need to protect the security of our networks will
surely be a significant consideration as the legislative process
proceeds.2 95 As discussed, however, there is no technically feasible
way to provide back doors to good guys without also making them
accessible to bad guys. 296 Moreover, for anonymization
technologies like Tor to work on an individual operational level for
various types of government personnel, they must also be available
to the general public.297 Indeed, the diversity of the user base is an
essential part of Tor's security protocols-if only government
personnel use Tor, their identities will not be secure.29 8
291 See supra Part Ill.
292 See supra Part III.A.
293 See supra Part III.C.
294 See supra note 260.
295 See supra Part III.C.
296 See supra Part III.C.
297 See supra Part Ill. A.
298 See supra Part Ill. A.
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Privacy-enhancing technologies like Tor and Silent Circle are,
in effect, helping to advance the communications privacy dialogue
insofar as they link certain aspects of electronic privacy with
security. Moreover, although they do not carry the legal clarity or
authority of a judicial mandate or congressional action through
legislation, these privacy-enhancing technologies nevertheless
offer the promise of a temporary "technology fix" that might adjust
the prevailing imbalance of power in the favor of government
surveillance activities until judicial or legislative action can
provide a more definitive answer. To be sure, they are not a
privacy mandate. At least in the short run, however, they offer a
quick, sure mechanism to constrain the palpable growth of
government power noted with such apprehension by some of the
Justices in Jones.
IV. CONCLUSION
Following the D.C. Circuit's Maynard99 decision-where the
first manifestation of a Fourth Amendment mosaic-type theory
appeared 3 00-DOJ chose to petition the Supreme Court for review
and certiorari was granted in Jones.30 ' Perhaps DOJ expected the
Court both to uphold the Knotts rule that "a person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another"302 and to
reject the mosaic theory outright due to the kind of chaotic legal
landscape that could result if Fourth Amendment doctrine
embraced some form of the mosaic theory. The reliance on Knotts
in the Government's brief303 and oral argument"* would suggest
this was their expectation and, at least for the time being, DOJ
secured this very narrow result. But what DOJ may not have
expected was a kind of clarity of vision from the Court with
299 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).300 Id. at 562; see also supra Part II.B.
301 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544, reh'g denied sub nom. United States v. Jones,
625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
302 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)
303 See supra note 9.
3 See supra notes 1-2.
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respect to the consequences of following DOJ down the path of
simply affirming Knotts. At a legal symposium on the Jones
case, 30 ' Antoine Jones's co-counsel, Professor Walter Dellinger,
recounted 306 how he had described such consequences in an
interview with Nina Totenberg:
If the Supreme Court gave a green light to [warrantless GPS tracking,
then] any officer can install any GPS device for any reason on
anybody's car, even if the officer thinks it would be interesting to know
where Supreme Court justices go at night when they leave the
courthouse. No one would be immune from having GPS devices
installed on their vehicles. 307
Professor Dellinger went on to relate how that interview had aired
the very morning of the Jones oral argument, at which Chief
Justice Roberts' questioning included the hypothetical that led off
this Article 308 -Dellinger's hypothetical-asking the Deputy
Solicitor General whether the Government's theory permitted the
tracking of Supreme Court Justices with GPS devices attached to
their cars.30' Professor Dellinger offered that he knew Jones had
likely won his case when that question was asked, with "doctrine
to follow"-whatever it might be.3 0
For now, the very specific morsel of doctrine that has followed
from the majority opinion spared DOJ, for the time being, from the
mosaic theory or a modern re-evaluation of the third party doctrine
that could limit broad law enforcement access to non-content
data."' Justice Scalia, with the assistance of Justice Sotomayor's
vote, found a way to contain these issues and address government
use of a GPS tracking device through a more limited trespass-
based theory. 312 But Justice Scalia's exasperated, more than
305 North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology Symposium: U.S. v. Jones:
Defining A Search in the 21' Century (Jan. 25, 2013).
306 Dellinger, supra note 146.
307 Nina Totenberg, Do Police Need Warrants For GPS Tracking Devices?
NPR (Nov. 8, 2011), http://m.npr.org/story/142032419.
308 See supra text accompanying note 1.
309 Dellinger, supra note 146.
3 10 id.
311 See supra Part II.
312 See supra Part II.
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rhetorical question at oral argument, "Don't we have any
legislatures out there that can stop this stuff?" 13 should serve
notice upon DOJ about what a future case and changes or additions
to Fourth Amendment doctrine could bring. Indeed, if DOJ had
gone to the Court that morning expecting a friendly pro-law
enforcement majority that would unequivocally endorse the logic
of Knotts, Justice Scalia's message, though quietly uttered, should
have had, for all who could interpret its import, the echoed force of
Hamlet's words of rejection to Ophelia, another expectant but
disappointed suitor-"DOJ: Get Thee to a Legislature."3 14
The arguments in the concurrences, on the other hand, do not
so much echo the cruelty of Hamlet's rejection of Ophelia as his
later ironic observation that he "must be cruel, only to be kind""'
in berating his mother for marrying his Uncle Claudius less than a
month after his father's death. If Justice Scalia's musings are
subtle and measured, the concurrences are more urgent, perhaps
threatening. The concurrences serve both to amplify Justice
Scalia's hint and to identify the specific nature of the threat posed
to law enforcement equities by continued reliance on the Court.
Authored, as they are, by two Justices representative of the
ideological poles of the current panel, they not only pointedly
show DOJ that "the Justices of this Court"1 6 will offer it no succor
in this particular case, but they seem to foreclose the very
possibility of any future positive relief in this venue by brandishing
such bleak alternative solutions as a potential endorsement of some
form of the mosaic theory or some yet unarticulated way of
limiting or curtailing the third party doctrine, either of which could
have damaging ramifications for law enforcement equities.' The
message of the concurrences is not a note of paternal advice but,
rather, one of stern warning. A future case with less containable
3' Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 26.
314 "Get Thee to a Nunnery," WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2, 11.
120 21.
315 Id. at act 3, sc. 4, 1. 178.
316 See Statement of Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben, Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 9.
317 See supra Part II.D.
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facts could force Justice Scalia and his colleagues to render a more
definitive, if much less palatable decision. Taken together, then,
the opinions in Jones serve as a coordinated signal to DOJ that it
should commit itself to the thorny path of the legislative process to
avoid the consequences of any such, yet unarticulated, "doctrine to
follow."
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